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Abstract  
This thesis is a critical investigation of the emerging solar economy in Morocco. The launch of 
the Moroccan Solar Plan in 2009 has attracted substantial amounts of foreign investment. 
Notably, several multilateral development banks support the country’s large-scale solar 
projects. Instead of climate change mitigation however, their engagement is rather framed by 
an eco-modern ideology that aims at the reconciliation of economic growth and environmental 
sustainability. Through a critical discourse analysis this thesis studies to what extent ecological 
modernisation discourse is present in four texts in which key stakeholders who represent 
European, German, African, and Moroccan interests justify their respective engagement in 
Morocco’s solar sector. By drawing on eco-modernisation discourse the actors present the 
sector as progressive and climate-friendly. The discourse is coupled with a hegemonic 
development discourse that equates growth and development. Both discourses are embedded in 
a complex web of neoliberal politics, unequal power relations and diverging group interests. 
The search for the topic of climate change in the texts revealed that it is dealt with in a vague 
manner that leaves open in what ways economic growth contributes to climate change 
mitigation.  
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     “Will we look into the eyes of our children and confess  
that we had the opportunity but we lacked courage?      
          That we had the technology but lacked the vision?”  
Greenpeace Energy (R)Evolution, 2012  
1 Introduction  
Against the background of the looming climate crisis, alternative energy sources that help to 
mitigate climate change and avoid the most apocalyptic scenarios of global warming are 
desperately needed. Renewable energies are widely accepted as a sustainable alternative to 
fossil fuels. In 2012 however, the global share of non-renewable resources still amounted to 
over 80% of final energy consumption (over 90% not counting traditional biomass. REN21 
2014, 13). The EU strives toward its self-imposed 2020 goals which imply 20% less 
greenhouse gas emissions compared to 1990, 20% energy from renewables, and 20% increase 
in energy efficiency by the year 2020 (European Commission 2015).  
However, renewable energies are not only a central topic in industrialised European nations – 
much discussed is the question of how to deal with the emissions of emerging economies with 
accelerating growth of both population size and economy (cf. Harvey 2015). In recent years, 
Morocco has set a worldwide example for a rapid transition to renewable energies 
(Auswärtiges Amt 2014). Launched in 2009, the government’s renewable energy plan aims at 
a renewable share of 42% by 2020. Wind, solar, and hydropower are the main pillars of this 
transition. The expansion of renewable energies in Morocco happens in a larger context of 
economic development and market liberalization. It is mostly financed by private-public 
partnerships and multilateral development banks (MDBs). These actors present Morocco’s 
energy strategy as an example par excellence of sustainable development and green growth 
(cf. World Bank 2014, AfDB 2014). The common narrative of these concepts is the 
assumption that the consideration of ecological factors does not necessarily restrict the 
economy but actually bears a lot of potential to boost innovation, technology, and ensure 
economic growth. Eradicate inequality, unemployment, illiteracy, and lack of access to public 
services (UNICEF 2013), and at the same time help to save the climate? Certainly sounds 
tempting. However, this way of framing it leaves out important dimensions of unequal power 
relations, unsustainable patterns of production and consumption, as well as the question how 
much renewable technology can really contribute to the mitigation of climate change.  
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1.1 Purpose and development of the research  
The aim of this study is to find out to what extent the Moroccan renewable energy sector is 
rooted in ecological modernisation discourse and what limitations that entails with regards to 
climate protection. 
This thesis has its roots in a LUCID research project that I took part in from October 2014 to 
March 20151. The research project set out with a central interest in Desertec2 because it saw 
the need to add a political ecology perspective to the existing research on North Africa’s 
emerging solar economy. Due to my participation in the research project, my initial interest 
was the Desertec concept, its history, its development over the past years, the implications for 
Europe and North Africa, and the reasons for its apparent demise. However, being in Morocco 
and talking to a variety of stakeholders who are involved in the solar economy revealed that 
Desertec has never played a significant role for the country’s renewable energy politics. 
Surely, the idea of exporting energy to other countries at some point in the future seems to be 
commonly known – though it may not be labelled as “Desertec”. But what seemed more 
important to me (at least at this point in time) was not the concept and case of Desertec but 
rather the study context and development of the Moroccan solar economy more closely.   
Above all, I became very curious about the role of climate change as a propulsion for the 
solar economy. It surprised me that climate-related issues did not seem to be a major motive 
for any of the stakeholders involved – despite the key role that renewable energies play in 
prominent climate mitigation scenarios (cf. REN21; IPCC 2011; Greenpeace 2012; WWF 
2011). I had expected them to draw on these issues to a much larger extent in order to explain 
the rapid expansion of the renewable sector and their respective engagement in it. Although it 
was mentioned by some interviewees, I did not get the impression that climate change or 
other environmental issues were a driving force in the process. Rather, the stakeholders of the 
Moroccan solar economy seemed to aim at pushing economic growth through strong 
investment in environment-friendly technology – the core principle of ecological 
                                                 
1
 The research was conducted by a team of five researchers (including myself) from Lund University: Andreas 
Malm, Anna Kaijser, Rikard Warlenius, and Vasna Ramasar. I will sometimes use the plural form to indicate 
that certain activities or thoughts refer to the entire team whereas I use the first person singular to demarcate my 
own findings and ideas. However, at times the boundaries are not clearly demarcated and I want to emphasise 
that I do not want to appropriate shared knowledge and thus use the collected data only as additional material 
(see 3.3.).  
2
 In a nutshell, the Desertec concept envisions the production of large amounts of solar energy in the Sahara 
desert, thus meeting the rising energy demand in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The surplus 
energy is supposed to get exported to Europe via high-voltage cables through the Mediterranean (Desertec 
Foundation, n.d., see also section 2.3.)   
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modernisation. This impression seemed validated when we learnt that Morocco’s government 
builds a new collar power plant that will generate more than the double amount of energy than 
the largest solar complex is supposed to deliver (Jeune Afrique 2014). Could it be possible 
that the renewable sector was merely a strategy to attract foreign capital to a country that by 
all available means strives for economic growth and industrialization (cf. Beard’s (2013) 
discussion of Morocco as a rentier state)? 
Based on these thoughts, I formulated one over-arching research question:  
What are the motivations driving the massive and rapid expansion of the Moroccan solar 
economy?  
This thesis puts a strong focus on the discursive aspect of the phenomenon in question. I 
believe that the analysis of discourse (both as language and as way of constructing and 
framing social phenomena) can reveal aspects of reality that otherwise remain invisible. It is 
an important tool to deconstruct and critically study material practices. I could find answers to 
my research question by studying planned and ongoing solar power projects as well as 
interviewing politicians, engineers, and bankers. However, adding a discursive layer to this 
analysis enables me to not only rely on standardized statements of experts, but to put these 
statements into a wider social context. Drawing on Harvey’s conceptualisation of social 
practice, I see discourse as one aspect of the social world that internalises other non-discursive 
aspects like power, social relations, material practices, institutions, and beliefs/values/desires 
(cf. Harvey 1996). 
Therefore I developed three further, more concrete research questions that aim at the study of 
the Moroccan solar economy as a discursive landscape that is constituted by multiple 
discourses.  
1. To what extent does the discourse of the Moroccan solar economy draw on concepts of     
ecological modernisation?  
2. How does the issue of climate change get addressed and strategically used by different 
actors? 
3. Does the discourse reveal insights on unequal power relations and discursive struggles? 
The first and the second question are directly related to the aim of the study and the main 
research question. I then add the third one because questions of power are necessary for a 
4 
 
critical analysis from a political economy perspective (see also section 2.1.). I deploy notions 
of power and hegemony throughout my thesis as a critical lens through which both discursive 
and non-discursive processes and practices can be explained and critically deconstructed.  
1.2 Structure of the thesis  
This thesis is divided into five chapters. After the introduction, chapter two marks out the 
theoretical and analytical framework. I locate the study in a framework of political economy 
and political ecology and outline important theoretical concepts. First, I give an introduction 
to ecological modernisation and techno-optimism. Following this, I introduce a critical notion 
of discourse and power and link these to the hegemonic position that ecological 
modernisation holds these days. This critical view is complemented by a brief overview of 
texts and authors who have formulated critique of ecological modernisation.  
Chapter three is the methodology chapter that mainly focuses on critical discourse analysis as 
well as its ontological and methodological implications, but also addresses limitations of the 
study. Chapter four lays out some facts about the socio-political context of Morocco’s solar 
economy and the development of current projects. Subsequently the fifth chapter is devoted to 
the actual analysis. After a brief presentation of the selected text material, I analyse the texts 
along the lines of Fairclough’s method of critical discourse analysis. I present the findings of 
the analysis and discuss them in a framework of neoliberal critique. The final chapter 
summarises the findings, outlines further thoughts on challenges regarding renewable 
energies, and concludes with an outlook and future research potential.  
1.3 Literature review 
A few scholars and books are particularly relevant for my thesis. In terms of environmental 
discourse, I mainly draw on Maarten Hajer and John Dryzek. Whereas Dryzek (1997) 
provides an excellent overview of major tendencies of environmental discourse over the past 
decades, Hajer focuses on ecological modernisation (EM). My summary of the history of EM 
is mainly based on his book The Politics of Environmental Discourse: Ecological 
Modernization and the Policy Process (1997). The two authors add a valuable component to 
general EM literature from Mol, Spaargaren (2000), and Jänicke (2007), who were the first 
scholars to develop EM as a distinct school of sociological thought. As an example of current 
EM discourse I use the recent publication An Ecomodernist Manifesto (Asafu-Adjaye et al. 
2015). Although I am aware of its quite drastic and simplifying way of talking about the 
world, I see it as a fascinating and interesting document due to the quite reputable 
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circumstances of its publication (18 scholars and researchers associated with an established 
research institute).   
My interest in connecting EM discourse with a critical notion of power of course leads me to 
Foucault (1979) and Gramsci (1971) who have made essential contributions to the field of 
discourse, power, hegemony, and ideology. The works of Norman Fairclough (1992, 1996) 
and Ruth Wodak (1997) build the foundation for critical discourse analysis. Since particularly 
Fairclough has extensively written and published about his discourse analysis approach, I 
have consulted Jorgenson and Philipp's introduction to discourse analysis which presents a 
helpful overview of his theory and method.  
The authors and scholars mentioned in this section are certainly the most important ones for 
the theoretical foundation of my thesis But there are others who I do not reference a lot, 
amongst them my teachers and professors from Lund, whose thoughts and words have 
contributed an even more substantial part to this thesis by shaping my own perception of the 
world.  
2 Framework of the study 
2.1  Political economy and political ecology  
If every decision-maker in this world was prioritising climate change mitigation, we would 
not face the ecological crisis we are facing today. Taking a political economy perspective 
enables us to search for root causes of the current crisis instead of only trying to tackle its 
consequences. In contrast to neoclassical economics, political economy is derived from a 
Marxist perspective that regards economics not as detached from history and politics. While 
many economists frame economy in the isolation of mathematical models, charts and graphs, 
a Marxist perspective suggests that economy can only be analysed in a political way. Political 
economy is not about the quantitative relations between commodities, but rather social 
relations. As Marx puts it in the context of the discussion of the relative form of value: “some 
social relation lies at the bottom of it” (Capital, p. 38) 
Mosco’s description of political economy as the study of “the social relations, particularly the 
power relations, that mutually constitute the production, distribution, and consumption of 
resources” (2009, 23) encapsulates the important aspects of my thesis. This perspective allows 
me to frame Morocco’s solar economy with a critical analysis of power relations that are at 
play. Following Hornborg’s (2011) critical notion of technology, I do not perceive renewable 
energy or the corresponding technologies as depoliticised things but as social processes. This 
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is why this thesis looks behind the smooth façade of the rapidly expanding solar sector in 
Morocco and addresses questions about power, agency, and self-interests.  
2.2 Ecological Modernisation 
There are multiple uses and meanings of ecological modernisation (in the following 
abbreviated as EM). Buttel (2000) identifies four main branches: 1) EM as a school of 
sociological thought; 2) EM as environmental discourse, mainly associated with the work of 
Maarten Hajer; 3) EM as strategic environmental management and environmental 
improvement in the private sector; and 4) EM very broadly used to describe all sorts of 
environmental policies and innovations. 
Throughout this paper, I refer to all of these four meanings, although I merge 3 and 4 because 
I do not consider the exact differentiation as important to my argumentation. I shall explicitly 
demarcate the difference where it is necessary. When not specified, the term does not refer to 
one particular interpretation but rather to EM as an over-arching paradigm that includes all of 
them.  
The term “ecological modernisation” was initially coined by a group of German social 
scientists in the early 1980s “to provide a formula for the interplay of economy and ecology.” 
(Jänicke 2007, 557) It was rooted in debates about demodernisation, deindustrialization, and 
counter-productivity, and was developed as a challenge to these theoretical trends (Mol & 
Spaargaren 2000, 19). EM should create a linkage between the constant modernisation drive 
in Western market economies and the need for a more environmental friendly development. 
Environmental technologies were seen as the central tool in this process (ibid.). Advocates of 
EM see the possibility for a positive correlation between economic growth and environmental 
quality. In an extreme form, this has been theorised in the concept of the Environmental 
Kuznets Curve which was an attempt to prove that rich economies have a less negative 
environmental impact than poorer ones (cf. Stern 2003).  
Eco-modernists are characterised by a large degree of trust in policies and the role of the state. 
They view political actors as responsible for setting up a legislative and institutional 
framework that creates the right conditions for eco-friendly growth (Fisher & Freudenburg 
2001, 702). Dryzek (1997) conceptualises this approach as Administrative Rationalism. 
Typical institutions and practices include natural resource management, pollution control, 
environmental impact assessment, and environmental planning. Besides governments, key 
agents of EM are “businesses, reform-oriented environmentalists, and scientists” (ibid. 174).  
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The Club of Rome report Limits to Growth (1972) is widely referred to as one of the first 
milestones towards public awareness of environmental problems that urgently needed to be 
addressed through a joint international effort (e.g. Dryzek 1997, Huesemann 2011, 119). In 
contrast to intellectual thought of the radical environmental movements whose principles 
implied a range of significant societal changes and power shifts, the suggestions of the Club 
of Rome were far more appealing for political and economic actors. According to Jänicke, 
this is because,  
“[…] an environmental problem proves politically less difficult to resolve if a marketable solution 
exists. In contrast, if a solution to an environmental problem requires an intervention in the established 
patterns of production, consumption, or transport, it is likely to meet resistance.” (2207, 557)  
EM suggests environmental-friendly technology as this “marketable solution” which does not 
require substantial changes of the status quo but incorporates environmental concerns into the 
paradigm of continued economic growth. Section 2.3. will expand on this.  
Two other document that played a central role in raising global environmental awareness were 
the IUCN’s World Conversation Strategy report as well as the WCDE’s report Our Common 
Future (1987) that brought the term sustainable development into the focus of international 
development debates (Giddens 1998, 56; Mol and Sonnenfeld, 2000). The term was famously 
defined by the Brundtlandt commission as “development that meets the need of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” (WCDE 
1987) One of the main pillars for how to reach this global satisfaction of human needs is 
economic growth. In chapter 2 of the report, the commission outlines the way the concept of 
sustainable development should impact environmental and economic policies. On top of the 
list: “reviving economic growth” and “changing the quality of growth” (WCED 1987, 46). 
Growth was no longer seen as contradictory to environmental protection. Instead, the 
worldview represented in the report was more or less identical with neoclassical theory in 
proposing economic growth as a panacea for alleviating poverty, environmental degradation, 
and climate change (for an extended discussion see Hornborg 2003).  
Since the term sustainable development (re-)appeared in 1987, it has been used inflationary 
(Huesemann 2011, 119). Lawn (2001, 2) points out that the concept has remained so vague 
that everything “deemed subjectively and arbitrarily ‘good’” has been classified as an 
example of sustainable development. There have been at least 40 different working definitions 
but no real consensus about what the concept actually implies (Hajer 1997, 1, O’Conner 1994, 
153; Giddens 1998, 56).  
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Although the terms “sustainability” and 
“sustainable development” are still widely 
used, it became clear that they do not 
provide graspable strategies and 
approaches for environmental governance. 
Instead, EM came to be seen as a new and 
improved synonym for sustainability that 
could offer this strong framework in terms 
of policy-making and economic guidelines 
(Buttel 2000, 60/63, Dryzek 1997, 172). 
Whereas the original concept focused 
mainly on national issues of waste 
management and air pollution, these 
problems of the 1980s may seem “rather trivial” in the 21st century, “compared with global 
warming, overpopulation, and increased entropy” (Andersen and Massa 2000, 338). However, 
EM has kept pace with the changing world and broadened its focus both theoretically and 
geographically (Mol and Sonnenfeld, 2000). The scope of recent EM scholarship includes the 
“[c]hanging role of science and technology […], [the] increasing importance of market 
dynamics and economic agents […], [t]ransformation in the role of the nation-state […], 
[m]odifications in the position, role, and ideology of social movements […], [as well as] 
changing discursive practices and emerging new ideologies.” (ibid.) 
In April 2015, in the midst of this thesis writing process, a controversial document was 
published, called: An Ecomodernist Manifesto (Asafu-Adjaye et al. 2015; fig.1). It is co-
authored by “eighteen leading lights of the sustainability movement” (Caradonna et al. 2015, 
1). They describe themselves as “ecopragmatists and ecomodernists” (7) and their paper 
admits that there are great challenges humankind faces in the 21st century, but “that 
knowledge and technology, applied with wisdom, might allow for a good, or even great, 
Anthropocene” (6). The main strategy to protect the environment and mitigate climate change 
is “decoupling human development from environmental impacts” (7) which becomes possible 
through modern-day technology. The manifesto claims that the predictions of “Limits to 
Growth” are not going to come true in the foreseeable future and does not acknowledge any 
relevant “physical boundaries to human consumption” (10). Its authors argue that it is not 
overconsumption which leads to the destruction of the planet but “the continued dependence 
of humans on the natural environments” (17). Whereas classic EM discourse tends to simply 
 
Figure 1: An Ecomodernist Manifesto, cover sheet. Source: 
ecomodernism.org 
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ignore any limits to economic and population growth (Dryzek 1997, 174), the manifesto goes 
a step further: it explicitly negates them. The manifesto epitomises one direction EM has 
taken over the past decades. Still being based on the irrevocable faith in technology, its focus 
is no longer exclusively on local environmental problems but includes the global threat of 
climate change.  
2.3 The future is golden and green: techno-optimism and renewable energies3 
The Ecomodernist Manifesto exemplifies the crucial role that technology plays in eco-modern 
future scenarios. A positive attitude towards technology is not only typical but essential to EM 
thought. Due to the growing consensus that the burning of fossil fuels is the main cause for 
global climate change, all eyes are on renewable energies nowadays (IPPC 2011, REN 21, 
2014). The belief that the world needs a shift towards renewable energy in order to mitigate 
climate change is pervasively present in current EM discourse. In the following, I present a 
selection of prominent examples that shows how this discourse has sprawled into diverse 
areas of science and politics.  
In 2012, Greenpeace International published an updated version of its Global Energy 
(R)Evolution scenario which contained detailed calculations on how the world could be 
powered by renewable energy only. The report should provide “a consistent fundamental 
pathway for protecting our climate through investment in renewable energy.” It stated that 
“the scale of the challenge requires a complete transformation of the way we produce, 
consume and distribute energy, while maintaining economic growth.” (Greenpeace 2012, 
emphasis added).  
Another so-called 100% scenario was published by the World Wildlife Fund (WWF). As an 
introduction to the report, the general director of WWF International James P. Leape is 
quoted:  
“By 2050, we could get all the energy we need from renewable sources. This report shows that such a 
transition is not only possible but also cost-effective, providing energy that is affordable for all and 
producing it in ways that can be sustained by the global economy and the planet. The transition will 
present significant challenges, but I hope this report will inspire governments and business to come to 
grips with those challenges and, at the same time, to move boldly to bring the renewable economy into 
reality.” (WWF International 2011)  
The two statements highlight the economic and institutional aspect of the energy transition. In 
doing so, they show well how two of the most prestigious environmental NGOs worldwide 
engage in the reproduction of the eco-modernist discourse. 
                                                 
3
 The structure of this section is based upon Rikard Warlenius’ article “A renewable transition” (2015).  
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Figure 2: Energy [r]evolution, Greenpeace, Cover Page. 
Source: 
http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/publications/Campa
ign-reports/Climate-Reports/Energy-Revolution-2012/ 
Figure 3: The Energy Report, WWF, Cover Page. 
Source: http://www.wwf.org.uk/wwf_articles.cfm? 
unewsid=4565 
The statement that I chose as an introduction quote can be found in the Global Energy 
(R)Evolution scenario of Greenpeace. It presents the renewable transition as something 
feasible with the technological means we have today – the hurdle is not the technology but the 
lacking political, institutional, and societal transformation (or “courage” as Greenpeace puts it 
quite dramatically, without quite being clear of who the big “We” refers to [humankind?]). 
This technology-centred approach is shared by numerous scientists who point out that a world 
powered by renewable energies is within reach (e.g. Sovacool and Watts 2009, Jacobson and 
Delucchi 2010, Desertec Foundation 2009).  
The concept of DESERTEC constitutes a particularly spectacular energy scenario. It caused a 
media hype when it was introduced to the public in 2009. Based on calculations of the 
physicist Gerhard Knies, the idea sounds compelling: In only six hours, the world’s deserts 
receive more energy (in form of solar radiation) than the entire world population consumes in 
one year (Desertec Foundation 2009). Since energy can be transmitted over 3000km-long 
distances, about 90% of the world’s population could be supplied with solar energy from the 
deserts (ibid.). “The Technologies are available and already in commercial use”, states the 
Desertec Foundation on their homepage (Desertec Foundation, n.d.). The concept was 
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presented as a silver bullet to issues of development, global warming, energy security, water 
scarcity, and others (Desertec Foundation 2009, Rothe 2014). However, it came to a halt in 
2014 after the majority of industrial partners had left the initiative and internal conflicts had 
severely damaged the image of the project (Meza 2014; Stonington 2012).  
The Desertec project was heavily criticised by the German social democrat Herman Scheer 
who was a central figure in the German Energiewende debate. He opposed the centralised and 
large-scale approach of Desertec which he saw as a strategy of large energy corporations to 
retain their powerful position. Scheer advocated a small-scale and decentralised approach that 
would hand over control to communities and individuals and thus bring forth profound re-
structuring not only of the energy sector but of the entire society (Scheer 2012).  
Taken together, these examples show that despite variations in the extent to which larger 
societal and structural changes are demanded, renewable energy technology is widely 
acknowledged as the main strategy to mitigate climate change.  
2.4 Discourse and power 
Is it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to whatever degree, from 
having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions, and preferences in such a way that they 
accept their role in the existing order of things, either they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or 
because they see it as natural and unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained and 
beneficial? (Lukes 2005, 8) 
For a critical study of the Moroccan solar economy, it is not sufficient to place it in a 
framework of EM discourse and techno-optimism. As I explained in the introduction, I deploy 
power throughout my thesis as a lens to analyse the larger social structures in which 
Morocco’s solar discourse is embedded.  
Discourse has become a fashionable and thus increasingly vague term over the past decades, 
being used in a multitude of ways to describe distinct instances and practices of language use 
(Holzscheiter 2005, 8-9, Jørgensen and Louise Phillips 2002, 1). Jørgensen and Phillips offer 
a definition of discourse as a “particular way of talking about and understanding the world” 
(2002, 2). A similar but slightly more concrete definition is formulated by John S. Dryzek:  
A discourse is a shared way of apprehending the world. Embedded in language, it enables those who 
subscribe to it to interpret bits of information and put them together in coherent stories or accounts. 
Discourses construct meanings and relationships, helping define common sense and legitimate 
knowledge. (2013, 9) 
He further argues that a discourse is usually filled with many different meanings and 
oftentimes politically contested whereas a concept is much more clearly demarcated (ibid., 
149).  
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Whereas there is nothing wrong with these definitions and interpretations, they neglect the 
interconnection of discourse and power. Amongst the most prominent figures who laid out the 
foundation for the analysis of discourse and power, was Michel Foucault. In his thought, 
power is not a defined entity, a privilege that individual agents can possess; rather it is 
exercised through different social practices and institutions (Foucault 1979, 26-27). These 
complex structures of power and power relations “go right down into the depth of society” 
and transcend diametrical divisions like state – citizen or capitalist class – working class 
(ibid.). Foucault also reflected on the interplay of power and knowledge. He emphasises that 
“there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor 
any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations.” 
(ibid.) This thought is carried further to what Foucault calls “regimes of truth” which basically 
addresses the questions whose knowledge is claimed and accepted to be true (Rose 2001, 
138).  
Power can be exercised in two ways: On the one hand, there is the “exercise of power through 
coercion”, power as actual physical force. On the other hand, there is the “exercise of power 
through consent” which is by far the more powerful tool because most people are not aware of 
it. The central tool to create consent is ideology (Fairclough 1989, 4; Joseph 2002, 1). 
Fairclough remarks that the “exercise of power, in modern society, is increasingly achieved 
through ideology” (1989, 2). He uses the power hierarchy between doctor and patients as an 
example to explain “common-sense assumptions” that usually accompany certain interactions 
(i.e. the doctor knows about diseases and medication, the patient does not). These assumptions 
are ideologies, and mostly people are not aware of them. Since ideologies depend on certain 
power relations in which the interactions are embedded, ideology and power are closely 
interlinked. Fairclough as a critical linguist sees ideology as “pervasively present in language” 
(ibid., 3) which is one of the premises for his notions of discourse analysis. I will come back 
to this in the methodology section. Wodak (2013, xvii) uses a similar vocabulary, pointing out 
that “dominant ideologies seem ‘neutral’, with assumptions that stay largely unchallenged. 
When people in a society think alike about certain matters, or even forget that there are 
alternatives to the status quo, one arrives at the Gramscian concept of hegemony”.  
Gramsci (1971) conceptualises hegemony as power of one dominant group over subordinate 
groups. In order to maintain hegemony, it is necessary to maintain the power relations that 
form the basis for a particular social formation (Ekers and Loftus 2007, 702). He emphasises 
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that ideology is an active force – it shapes people’s beliefs and actions. Hereby, hegemony is 
established and maintained (ibid.).  
Holzscheiter (2005) outlines three useful categories to analyse the interplay between power 
and discourse: 1) Power in discourse, 2) power over discourse, and 3) power of discourse. The 
former refers to struggles arising over contested meanings and interpretations, what Wodak 
calls “semiotic hegemony” (2013, 306). Analysing power over discourse answers questions 
like: Whose voices are heard? Who has access to public debates? And finally, Holzscheiter 
analyses power of discourse by looking at power struggles between different discourses.  
2.5 Ecological modernisation as a hegemonic discourse  
What happens now if we look again at the EM discourse but this time with these 
considerations in mind?  
Hajer (1997) offers a complex explanation how EM attained its prominent position within 
environmental (but also economic and political) discourse. His analysis shows that EM 
succeeded in bringing together diametrically opposed actors and discourses from throughout 
the political spectrum. Both radical environmental movements and technocratic experts were 
amongst the first ones to frame the environmental problems as a global crisis threatening 
human existence in the late 1960s (Hajer 1997, 83ff.). The demise of the grand metanarratives 
during the 1970s and 1980s that indicated the transition to postmodernity (cf. Lyotard 1984) 
brought the two previously diametrical worldviews closer together. The new approach of the 
environmental movement was much more policy-oriented and instead of offering alternatives, 
tried to create change from within the system (Hajer 1997, 93).  
The Club of Rome’s report The Limits to Growth (1972) was the first document that brought 
environmental problems into the political discourse (Foster 2008, 4). Hajer points out that the 
report’s success epitomises the strong interplay of discourse and power. Despite its status as a 
relatively small and unofficial group, the Club of Rome was acknowledged as a credible 
source of knowledge due to its “aura of respectability and knowledge ability” (1997, 82). For 
the first time, the message about the catastrophic impacts of modern society on the natural 
environment did not come from left-wing environmentalists but from a group that was 
constituted by policy-makers, economic experts, and scientists (ibid. 80). The following two 
documents that played important roles in the transformation of environmental discourse were 
the World Conservation Strategy, and the Brundlandt report Our Common Future. Both 
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reports were written and published with large support of the UN which proves how prominent 
the discourse already was.  
Considering the potential political and economic implications of these three reports, it seems 
strange that the sustainability discourse was adopted by business and economic institutions. 
Lawn (2001) offers an interesting explanation for this by drawing on Ruttan’s term 
establishment appropriation. Establishment appropriation occurs when dominant institutions 
strategically appropriate symbols of social and environmental struggles that they perceive as a 
threat to the established order. According to Lawn, this is what happened as a consequence to 
the Limits to Growth and Our Common Future: powerful institutions like the World Bank and 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) realised that the 
findings of the report could be interpreted in a way that would seriously challenging the 
economic system on which their power is based. Thus, they started to incorporate sustainable 
development as their leading paradigm. Through their dominant position in the new discourse, 
they made sure that the principle of economic growth not only maintained its legitimacy but 
also was reinforced by propagating its crucial role in the struggle for sustainable development 
(cf. Lawn 2001, Lélé 1991).  
In order to generally explain the dominance of certain discourse, Hajer (1997) introduces the 
concept of discursive formations. Based on the work of Foucault, he develops this term that 
describes the formation of groups of actors with potentially quite different interests who join 
forces in the struggle for discursive hegemony (1997, 16). Discursive formations are created 
“if previously independent practices are actively related to another” (ibid.) in a common 
project (Hajer explicitly refers to political projects). The actors have to come together under a 
common story-line which is basically a certain common discursive practice. The more 
credible and attractive the story-line, the more likely is the formation of a strong discursive 
coalition (ibid.).  
I suggest that ecological modernisation and sustainability discourse are cases of discursive 
formation which explains their hegemonic discursive position. They have succeeded in 
uniting diverse actors from both ends of the political spectrum under the common story-line 
of sustainable growth that reconciles environmental and economic needs. However, the actual 
intentions of the different advocates of this story-line vary to a significant degree, and can be 
at times contradictory. This does not weaken the discourse, however, but quite the opposite – 
it ensures that it becomes more powerful since a multitude of different parts of a society 
considers the story-line as credible. This offers an illuminating explanation of why both EM 
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discourse and renewable energy technology is promoted by environmental groups, 
corporations, governments, and scientists alike.  
However, the boundaries between discourses are hardly ever clear-cut. Likewise, there can be 
sub-discourses and meta-discourses, and contested discourses whose meaning is permanently 
negotiated. I consider these reflections as essential for my analysis because the Moroccan 
solar sector involves diverse and powerful stakeholders who have different agendas but still 
cooperate closely.  
Before I move on to methodological considerations and the actual analysis, the next section 
lays out some aspects of the manifold critique that EM and the concept of sustainable 
development have provoked over the past two decades. One way or the other, they all are 
connected to critical notions of power.  
2.6 TechNO-fix: Criticism of eco-modern thought  
It is difficult to clearly delineate the existing critique of EM since it overlaps to a large degree 
with critique of capitalism and neo-liberalism in general. However, since I position myself 
critically towards EM and the corresponding notions of technological fixes as well as the 
necessity of continued economic growth, I find it important to at least outline the debate. I 
will come back to several points I make in this section in the discussion of my analysis and 
the conclusion.  
 
Figure 4: Techno fixing the world. Source: http://www1.uwe.ac.uk/et/ 
A light criticism that addresses gaps of EM but does not question the need for economic 
growth per se, is formulated by Giddens. In The Third Way (1998), he points out that the 
“somewhat comfortable assumptions” of EM are “too good to be true” since they “[skirt] 
some of the main challenges ecological challenges pose for social democratic thought” (1998, 
57-58). Giddens critique targets mainly the flaws he sees in the political dimension of EM. 
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For instance, he points out that there is big gap in terms of scale: Whereas EM policy is a 
matter of national decision-making, environmental issues that should be addressed are 
primarily of global nature (1998, 58). Moreover, the increasing importance of technology for 
our personal lives poses a certain threat to democracy: technology and science are not subject 
to democratic processes but still largely in the hands of institutional authorities (61). 
A strand of critique that is more familiar with a political economy approach argues that 
sustainability and EM are merely new forms of green(-washed) capitalism. For instance, 
O’Connor (1994) asks whether a “truly ecological sustainable capitalism” is possible, and 
answers provocatively: “Not unless and until capital changes its face that would make it 
unrecognizable to bankers, money makers, venture capitalists, and CEOs (…).” (1994, 158) 
He sees the core problem in the capitalist system that frames the problem of the environment 
in a way that merely asks “how to remake nature in ways that are consistent with sustainable 
profitability and capital accumulation” (1994, 157).  
Deconstructing the concept of sustainability, Foster (2008) argues that the current notion of 
sustainability is a mirage. The implicit futurity of the concept impedes the urgently needed 
changes that society needs to make now. More important, the aim of decoupling economic 
growth and environmental degradation as envisioned in the official UK Sustainable 
Development Strategy is simply not viable unless it starts radically questioning patterns of 
production, consumption, and distribution. Foster stresses that simply relying on 
technological fixes is not enough.  
A technology-critical position is also taken by Hornborg (2001). According to Hornborg, the 
main achievement of EM is the “neutralization of the formerly widespread intuition that 
industrial growth is at odds with global ecology” (2001, 25). Industrial technology should be 
seen as a socio-cultural phenomenon that originates in the disharmony between economy and 
ecology (12). Hornborg frames his argumentation with world-system theory concepts of core 
and periphery and warns that “we imagine that education and “technology transfer” might 
solve problems of “underdevelopment”, forgetting, as it were, that new centres of industrial 
growth require new peripheries to exploit.” (11). I support the point that world-system theory 
can add valuable points to a critique of EM because the concept completely ignores the fact 
that better environmental performances in the industrialised countries of the core are mostly 
due to the relocation of carbon intensive and toxic industries to the periphery.  
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Foster and Hornborg both deploy a negative notion of “techno-fix” as a critical deconstruction 
of techno-optimist ideas. This approach to technology objects to the widespread conviction 
that the ecological crisis can be solved with technology without any profound changes in the 
economic system (Clark and York 2012, 23). Huesemann and Huesemann (2011) remark that 
“the complex societal challenge of sustainable development was reduced to the purely 
technical problem of improving industrial eco-efficiency […].” (2011, 120) Technology is 
criticised to veil the incompatibility of a capitalist system and ecological concerns (Clark and 
York 2012). In an extreme form, these techno-fixes result in the promotion of geoengineering 
as a solution to climate change. Whereas the warnings are getting louder, geoengineering is 
study object of prestigious institutions like the National Academy of Sciences (Queally 2015).  
The lack of radical (or any sort of) societal critique is also subject of two responses to The 
Ecomodernist Manifesto. The first one was written by Clive Hamilton and is titled The 
Technofix Is In. Hamilton considers the entire manifesto as outrageous but expands on two 
points in particular: 1) the authors’ promotion of nuclear power as the cleanest and most 
effective energy source; and 2) the lack of a critical political aspect that takes into 
consideration the “power of corporations and lobbyists to stop environmental laws, or to the 
total victory of money politics in the United States […]. Exxon and organized denialism do 
not appear even between the lines.” (Hamilton 2015). The first point might be arguable in 
terms of CO2 emissions and climate change, and is not typical for EM argumentation. In 
contrast, the second one is what generally differentiates the eco-modern way to frame 
environmental problems from more radical approaches – eco-modernists do not challenge the 
current system (be it in political, economic, or cultural terms) but actually put a high degree of 
trust in political institutions, the economy, and technology to solve pressing environmental 
and social issues.  
The second response to the manifesto comes from a number of Degrowth activists and 
scholars. Degrowth activists and thinkers demand a departure from the current neoliberal 
growth paradigm. They strive for sustainability but reject the eco-modern principles of 
endless growth and the central role that is assigned to technology (Caradonna et al. 2015, 2). 
The Degrowth movement promotes  
“to reduce economic activity, to downscale consumerist lifestyles, to move beyond conventional energy 
sources, to give up on the fantasy of ‘decoupling’ economic and population growth from the 
environment, and to rethink the technologies that have gotten us into our current predicament.” (ibid).  
To prove their point, they explain that the only time the CO2 emissions have declined in 
modern history were times of economic recession (ibid, 3). The Degrowth approach to 
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sustainability advocates bottom-up development by “organic, low-impact, and community-led 
efforts” (4). Whereas the Ecomodernist Manifesto treats agriculture and farming as inferior 
and backward processes and wants to reduce pressure on ecosystems through more 
technology, Degrowth puts a focus on a reconnection with nature through practices like 
permaculture and agroecology. Taking a more philosophical stance, they reject the eco-
modernists’ idea of pushing the developing world to catch up with the standards of the 
developed world but instead suggest a shift of values to “cease treating the present growth 
model as a limitless aspiration for others to follow.” (9).  
2.7 Conclusion 
The first part of my thesis has introduced my research interest and motivation for this study 
and built a theoretical framework for my analysis. Positioning my thesis in a framework of 
critical political economy and political ecology has helped me to highlight the importance of 
politicising both climate change and renewable energy technologies.  
I have presented some theoretical concepts that constitute the foundation for the next chapters. 
Mainly, I have focused on ecological modernization as theory, practice, and discourse. 
Closely related to the concept of sustainable development, EM has become the dominant 
approach to frame environmental issues by reconciling economic growth with environmental 
protection. It entails a techno-optimist discourse supported by economic experts, scholars, 
politicians and actors of civil society. This discourse promotes renewable technologies as the 
most successful way to mitigate climate change and at the same time secure human well-
being. It is not only this technology affinity that is sharply criticized by more critical authors 
but also the general greenwashing strategy of EM as well as its reproduction of capitalist, 
neoliberal, and Eurocentric ideas.  
As some kind of critical lens I have also introduced some very basic notions of discourse and 
power. These are important to explain and understand the hegemonic position of certain 
discourses as well as the processes which have led to this position. 
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3 Methodology  
3.1 Methodological framework 
3.1.1   CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 
Numerous scholars have reflected and written about the societal changes of the past three 
decades or so. This era, alternately called postmodernity (Harvey 1990), late modernity 
(Giddens 1991), or liquid modernity (Bauman 2000), has been a period of profound economic 
and social change. Above all, neoliberalism has been established as the dominant global 
economic order which has also deeply influenced social and political life (Fairclough and 
Chouliaraki 1999, 3). There is a widespread believe that there is nothing one can do to change 
this and the grand meta-narratives have lost their appeal to most people (ibid. 4; Lyotard 
1984). But, as Fairclough and Chouliaraki point out, “these changes are at least in part the 
outcome of particular strategies pursued by particular people for particular interests within a 
particular system.” (Fairclough and Chouliaraki 1999, 4) And this is where not only critical 
social science but also particularly critical discourse analysis comes into play. It is 
characteristic for the late modern era that these profound societal changes exist as discourses 
but also happen as actual processes. However, these processes are to a large extent shaped by 
discourse. Fairclough and Chouliaraki discuss how this is particularly important with regards 
to economic processes: Because discourse has such a large influence on economic reality, 
achieving discursive hegemony is an essential condition for maintaining economic power 
(ibid. 4-5).This assumption is highly important for the argumentation of this thesis because it 
is the hegemonic neoliberal eco-modernist discourse that I try to unveil in and behind the 
discourse around solar power in Morocco.  
But first I will develop further how critical discourse analysis (in the following abbreviated as 
CDA) fits into this framework of critical social sciences in the late modern area. This requires 
an extended understanding of the term “discourse”. In the previous chapter I introduced some 
very broad definitions to give an idea of the concept and its manifold meanings and 
interpretations. In order to understand how discourse is conceptualised within CDA, it is 
necessary to put a stronger focus on the linguistic aspect. According to Wodak (2001, 66), 
discourse is “a complex bundle of simultaneous and sequential linguistic acts, which manifest 
themselves within and across the social fields of action as thematically interrelated semiotic, 
oral, and written tokens.”. Holzscheiter uses this quote to stress the spatio-temporal dimension 
of discourse which she visualises “as a flow of knowledge, culture, and ideas through time 
expressed through language” (2010, 71).  
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CDA was developed as a distinct approach at the beginning of the 1990s. It unites a great 
diversity of approaches under one common goal: “the critique and challenge of hegemonic 
discourses, texts, and genres, that (re-)produce inequalities, injustices, mystification, and 
oppression in contemporary societies.” (Wodak 2013, xxv) An interdisciplinary approach is 
seen as essential “since serious social problems are naturally complex.” (van Dijk 1993, 252) 
Thus, CDA intentionally avoids positioning itself within a particular discipline, paradigm, or 
school. Instead, it draws on theory and methods from diverse fields like anthropology, 
philosophy, cognitive science, and different strands of linguistics (Wodak 2013, xxii; van Dijk 
1993, 252). Due to this diversity, the boundaries of CDA are not clearly defined; it does not 
constitute a fixed entity but rather a loose cluster of approaches with certain similarities as 
well as some differences (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002, 60).   
What makes CDA a powerful tool for critique is that it locates particular linguistic acts within 
a broader social context of unequal power relations in order to find out how power is exerted 
through language. These linguistic acts are mostly written and spoken texts but in some cases 
images as well (Fairclough 1989, 27-28). Discourse is not only constitutive of the social world 
but also constituted by social practice, so the relationship is dialectical. This is particularly 
emphasised by Fairclough (Fairclough 1992, 1997, 1999). I will come back to this in section 
3.2.1. which deals with Fairlcough’s methodological approach to CDA.  
The view of discourse being in a dialectical relationship with social practice explains why 
instead of studying a linguistic element separately, CDA is rather interested in the text as part 
of a social phenomenon, particularly in the role linguistic events play in the reproduction of 
unequal power relations (van Dijk 1993, 250). A text “is necessarily a particular snapshot of 
the larger discursive event” (Holzscheiter 2010, 67-69). In contrast to discourse analysis 
approaches that are rooted in the linguistic branch of discourse research, CDA is much closer 
to the sociological one – it subordinates text to context.  
3.1.2 DOES DISCOURSE END WHERE REALITY STARTS? ONTOLOGICAL AND 
EPISTEMOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS  
CDA is clearly distinguished from other strands of discourse analysis (for instance Lacleau 
and Mouffe’s discourse theory) by the clear boundaries that the approach draws between 
discursive and non-discursive practices. This indicates that it is rooted in a critical realist 
philosophy. In this section, I will present my understanding of how CDA and critical realism 
interact, overlap, and differ.  
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Critical realism is rooted in the philosophical thought of Roy Bhaskar and has been developed 
as a critical answer to both positivist and social-constructivist philosophy of science (Archer 
1998, 190). Put briefly, a critical realist view claims that there is an objective reality 
independent from our knowledge, however, this reality is open and changeable. Individuals 
are products of a society and reproduce or transform social reality through social action 
(ibid.).  
Critical realism puts an emphasis on underlying structures and mechanisms that are in a 
causal relation to social practice. Although critical realism acknowledges that science does not 
provide a guaranteed access to truth and that knowledge is socially constructed, it holds that 
we can critically investigate these structures and mechanisms according to which our social 
life functions. In Jonathan Joseph’s words: “The radical idea of this approach lies in critical 
realism’s focus on structures and underlying causes, and not just on ideas, events, states of 
affairs.” (2002, 11) This is of utter importance because “[a] hegemonic struggle is more than 
just a clash of world-views or group consciousnesses, it must challenge not only the dominant 
ideas within society, but the very social structures that produce them” (ibid.).  
So what has this to do with critical discourse analysis, the Moroccan solar economy and EM? 
I chose CDA both as a methodological approach and an analytical tool due to its explicit 
mission to demystify both ideology and power as well as its overall commitment to social 
struggles (Wodak 2013, xxiii). I want to find out how and to what extent EM discourse is 
present in the discourse around solar energy in Morocco and whether this offers explanations 
why climate change plays such a minor role in it. This research agenda fits well into a critical 
realist perspective since it is interested in structures and mechanisms that underlie social 
practice (as well as knowledge as a form of social practice). CDA and critical realism share 
this critical and emancipatory agenda which also leads back to my theoretical framework of 
political economy and political ecology (see 2.1.).  
Fairclough and Chouliaraki emphasise the importance to acknowledge discourse as a shaping 
force of social life but not to reduce social life to discourse (1999, 6). In the words of 
Fairclough: “All linguistic phenomena are social, not all social phenomena are linguistic.” 
(1989, 23) This supports Harvey’s approach to view discourse and language as one out of six 
moment that constitute social life, along with power, social relations, material practices, 
institutions/rituals, and beliefs/values/desires. All these moments are both in a dialectical 
relationship and internalise each other (cf. Harvey 1996). This resonates with the approach of 
this thesis. I study the discourse of the Moroccan solar economy in connection with material 
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practices (the actual power plants), power (hegemony of the eco-modernist discourse), 
institutions (involved stakeholders like MASEN or the IFI’s), social relations (how are these 
stakeholders interrelated?), as well as believes and values (neoliberal techno-optimist ideas). 
None of these aspects can be studied separately since they correlate with one another in 
multiple ways.   
Critical realism is also reflected in the position CDA takes towards the researcher. Critical 
discourse analysts “attempt to make their own positions and interests explicit while retaining 
their respective scientific methodologies and while remaining self-reflective of their own 
research process.” (Wodak 2013, xxiii) In contrast to social science that claims objectivity, 
the CDA researcher explicitly does not perceive themselves as politically neutral. Instead, 
their research follows certain emancipatory political aims, struggling for radical societal 
change (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002, 64). I consider this self-positioning very important for an 
effective critique.  
3.2 Methods and data-collection  
3.2.1 FAIRCLOUGH’S THREE-DIMENSIONAL MODEL  
Norman Fairclough is professor emeritus of linguistics at Lancaster University.4 He is one of 
the central scholars in the field of CDA. Fairclough has developed his own method of doing 
CDA, first introduced in Language and Power (1st edition published in 1989). There, he 
conceptualises his three-dimensional approach, as visualised in fig. 5. It is beyond the scope 
of this thesis to dive into his extensive theoretical foundations on which he develops his 
methodological approach. Since he was one of the “founding fathers” of CDA, much of these 
theoretical reflections also correlate with general CDA theory as outlined above. Thus, this 
section focuses rather on the actual method in order to pave the way for my own analysis in 
the following chapter. I only present a short and theoretical description since the subsequent 
analysis hopefully exemplifies Fairclough’s approach.  
Fairclough views discourse and language as an integral part of society, as one form of social 
practice that interacts with other, non-discursive elements (cf. Harvey’s (1996) six moments 
of social practice). Thus, discourse refers to “the whole process of social interaction of which 
text is just a part” (1989, 24). Besides the actual text, this process also entails “the process of 
production, of which a text is a product, and the process of interpretation, for which the text is 
                                                 
4
 Lancester University. (n.d.). Professor Norman Fairclough - Linguistics and English Language at Lancaster 
University. Retrieved May 17, 2015, from http://www.ling.lancs.ac.uk/profiles/norman-fairclough 
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a resource” (ibid.). These processes around the production and consumption of a text are part 
of the discursive practice. In simplified terms, they mean that people who produce a text (in 
oral, visual, or written form) always draw on existing knowledge, beliefs, values, and 
conventions which shape the way the text production is done. The same goes for the people 
who “consume” the text (i.e. read it, listen to it, watch it). Fairclough conceptualises these 
cognitive resources as member resources (1989, 24).  
 
Figure 5: Fairclough’s three-dimensional approach. Source: own visualisation 
 
The discursive practice acts as a mediator between a text and a larger framework of social 
processes and structures. Whereas Fairclough emphasises the importance of the detailed 
linguistic analysis of specific text in order to find out how power and ideology are reflected in 
them, he also criticises linguistic approaches due to their exclusive focus on textual analysis 
(Jørgensen & Phillips 2002, 66).  
Based on this, his three-dimensional approach to CDA implies three stages, each of them 
assigned to one dimension:  
1. Description (analysis of the formal linguistic properties of the text): Text.  
2. Interpretation (analysis of the relationship between text production and consumption: 
which existing discourses are drawn on?): Discursive practice.  
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3. Explanation (analysis of the social determination of production and consumption as 
well as their social effects: do they change or reproduce the current order of discourse 
and thus existing power relations?): Social practice.  
Analysing a text according to this approach requires different forms of analysis. The part of 
the text analysis follows a quite standardised linguistic procedure, looking at grammar, 
vocabulary, stylistic devices, and interactional control (dominance of one speaker over the 
other(s)).5 It is important to be aware of the ideological effects that result from the use of 
certain linguistic tools (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002, 84). In contrast to the text analysis, the 
analysis of discursive practice and social practice is much less determined and standardised. A 
useful tool for the interpretation stage is the concept of interdiscursivity that implies all the 
genres and discourses which the analysed text draws on. According to Fairclough, 
interdiscursivity “highlights a historical view of texts as transforming the past – existing 
conventions, or prior texts – into the present.” (1993, 137) That way, it helps us to reach a 
more complex understanding of the discursive event in question.  
When it comes to stage three, the explanation or analysis of social practice, another concept is 
introduced: the order of discourse (Fairclough 1989, 36; 1993, 4). The order of discourse 
studies the totality of discourses used in a particular social domain (Jørgensen & Phillips 
2002, 72). The researcher needs to investigate to what extent a discursive event reproduces or 
challenges the existing order of discourse. By reproducing the current order of discourse, the 
producer of a text perpetuates the status quo and maintains existing power relation. However, 
the text producers can deliberately choose to import new discourses from other social domains 
and doing so, initiate discursive and social change. Thus, the order of discourse is flexible and 
open to change. This is an important point to keep in mind for the second part of my analysis 
in section 5.5.  
3.2.2 INTERVIEWS  
During our field research in Morocco, we conducted a multitude of interviews with diverse 
actors who were in some way affected by or involved in the country’s solar economy. We 
talked to MASEN, to bank officials, to ADEREE, to solar engineers, environmental NGOs, 
farmers on the foothills of the Atlas Mountains, and social activists, amongst others.  
The interviews certainly constitute an intellectual point of departure for this thesis because 
they made me want to find out more about the things that were not being said. Despite this I 
                                                 
5
 For a more detailed description of what text features the analyst should look for, see appendix 1 
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decided not to use them as material for my analysis. This is for several reasons: Obviously 
difficult was the language barrier. Some interviews were conducted in English, some in 
French, German, Arabic, or Amazigh. Several were conducted by ourselves, for others we 
needed a translator. Oftentimes, the interviewees talked to us in their second or third language 
and the degree they appeared to feel comfortable with that varied. Therefore, I do not consider 
these interviews appropriate as material for a discourse analysis.  
Moreover, we distributed the interviews amongst us and conducted them in teams of at least 
two. We did not have a standardised questionnaire but mostly prepared them individually. I 
do not feel comfortable using the data for my analysis because I was only personally involved 
in half of the interviews. I believe that this would have some influence on the analysis because 
things like surroundings, atmosphere, appearance, and personal feelings always shape the 
researcher’s perception and behaviour. Much more though I do not want to take advantage of 
the fact that I worked together with a team scholars who all have much more academic 
experience than I do. I am very grateful for the fact that this research inspired me to write this 
thesis but I want to make sure that it is still an independent project, so that I do not find 
myself in a privileged position to the other students of my course.  
3.3 Limitations of the research  
Before I start with the analysis, I would like to address a few challenges and limitations I 
faced during the process of doing research and writing this thesis.  
As mentioned earlier, I initially planned to write about Desertec but changed my research 
agenda while I was in Morocco in March 2015. Thus, I certainly missed the chance to prepare 
the process of data collection better so the obtained information would be more useful for my 
thesis project. However, I found a topic that proved a lot more intriguing to me instead. In the 
previous paragraph I explained why I did not use the interviews as the main material for my 
analysis and this supports me in my conviction that I made the right decision even though it 
entailed a much more restricted time frame.  
This limited amount of time did not give me the chance to read as much as I would have liked 
to (if that is ever the case). Since I did not thoroughly study the works of Foucault, Gramsci, 
Bhaskar, and others, I am aware that my thesis may lack solid theoretical foundation in some 
parts. Nonetheless, I believe that I have grasped the central propositions these authors make 
so that I am able transfer them successfully to my own topic.  
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Language also turned out to be a challenging issue. My analysis of the actual texts (issues of 
grammar, for instance) would most likely be deeper and more complex if the text material 
was written in German, my first language. Two of the four texts were actually available in 
German but I chose to read the English versions due to reasons of consistency.  And then 
there is the MASEN document which is only available in French, my third language that I 
have not seriously practiced in years. But I considered the text as too important to ignore since 
it sheds light on the inner-Moroccan solar discourse and thus adds an indispensable 
perspective to my analysis. Although I am aware of the limitations this language barrier 
entails, I am convinced that they are not critical for this thesis. Since Fairclough’s model 
involves a rather simple linguistic analysis that is feasible for researchers without a 
background in linguistics, I believe that my language skills are sufficient to do this. I hope 
that becomes evident in the next chapter which contains my analysis.  
4 There is power in the sun: Discourses around Morocco’s solar power 
projects  
4.1 Solar energy in Morocco  
4.1.1 MOROCCO: BASIC FACTS  
In order to provide a basic geo-political framework for my study, this section presents a few 
key data about Morocco. If not indicated otherwise, they are based on the country information 
on the homepage of the German Federal Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt 2014).  
Morocco has about 33 million inhabitants and a population growth rate of 1,2% annually. The 
country stretches over 459,000 km² (in comparison: Sweden has 450,000 km²) and several 
climatic zones. Arabic and since quite recently also the Berber language Amazigh are official 
languages, French is widely spoken within the business and education sector. Morocco is a 
constitutional monarchy, King Mohammed V is the official head of state with wide-ranging 
power over the bicameral parliament. He is said to be a direct descendant of the Prophet 
which grants him a high degree of authority in a country where more than 99% of the 
population are Sunni Muslims. The first sector contributes about 15% to the GDB although it 
employs more than 45% of the population. There is a lot of small-scale subsistence farming 
but also a growing industrial agriculture sector which is supposed to increase profits through 
the “Plan Maroc Vert”. The Moroccan government strives for a high degree of integration in 
international markets and thus has increasingly adopted neoliberal policies and laws. The 
economy is growing steadily (4.7% in 2013, according to the African Development Bank 
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2014) and is perceived to be stable. Due to economic and population growth, energy 
consumption is expected to quadruple by 2030 (Norton Rose Fulbright 2012).  
However, the country struggles with high unemployment rates (35% amongst the urban 
youth), widespread poverty (6.3 million people still live under or just above the poverty line), 
and prevalent inequality regarding access to education and medical services (World Bank 
2015, UNICEF 2013). The conflict about Western Sahara is still unresolved, and the border 
with its neighbour country Algeria remains closed. Moreover, there are monopoly-like 
structures and repeated corruption accusation of the king and his associates who rules the 
country behind “the barest façade of democratic governance” (Williams 2014, Black 2010).  
4.1.2 MOROCCO’S RENEWABLE ENERGY LANDSCAPE  
A heavy financial weight for the government is the energy sector. Morocco’s indigenous oil 
and gas reserves are extremely limited; therefore, about 95% of the country’s energy is 
imported. This results in a high dependency on foreign supplies and international price 
fluctuations (Bahgat 2013, 23). Additionally, fuel and electricity have been highly subsidised 
over the past years (alongside with bread) which is referred to as a successful measure to 
avoid uprisings during the Arab Spring in 2011 (Thakore 2014).  
However, Morocco has a number of geographical and climatic conditions that prove 
favourable for renewable energies, particularly solar, wind, and hydro power: several rivers 
flow across the country and can be used to generate energy with hydro power, large parts of 
the country are desert or semi-desert with sunshine almost all year round which constitutes a 
crucial condition for solar power, and the long coastline as well as the large mountain areas 
provide great potential for extensive wind farms (Bahgat 2013, 23). Moreover, there is an 
existing power connection that between Morocco and Spain which makes it a particularly 
interesting country for European energy politics since it is the only African country that is 
connected to the European continent (ibid.).  
The Moroccan government has acknowledged the problematic energy situation and launched 
an ambitious renewable energy plan in 2008, according to which 42% (amounting to about 
6000MW) of its total energy mix is supposed to come from renewable sources by 2020 
(Norton Rose Fulbright 2012; MASEN [n.d.]). As part of the renewable energy plan, the 
government launched the Moroccan Solar Plan (MSP) one year later. The MSP sets the target 
of 2GW of solar capacity by 2020 which will be produced at five solar power stations in 
different parts of the country. Ouarzazate, Ain Beni Mathar, Sebkhat Tah are located in 
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Morocco, whereas the stations of Foum al Ouad and Boujdour will be built on Western 
Sahara territory. In order to reach its energy goals, the government has taken substantial 
efforts to develop a strong regulatory and legal framework that enables and pushes forward a 
rapid expansion of the solar sector (Norton Rose Fulbright 2012). Part of this effort is the set-
up of a complex landscape of political, administrative, and scientific institutions, as well as 
various energy laws. Central roles were assigned to the Ministry of Energy, Mining, Water 
and Environment, the Moroccan Agency for Solar Energy (MASEN), the Centre de 
Développement des Energies Renouvelables (CDER), the Agence Nationale pour le 
Développement des Energies Renouvelables et l'Efficacité Energetique (ADEREE), the 
L’Association Marocaine des Industries Solaires et Eoliennes (AMISOLE), and the Office 
National de l’Electricité (ONE). Within the solar sector, MASEN is the most important actor. 
Founded in 2010, its mission is the planning and implementation of solar projects, including 
supervision and coordination of project-related activities, the realization of necessary 
infrastructure improvements, as well as research, knowledge creation, and communication 
with investors (MASEN 2010). MASEN is a limited company (public-private partnership), 
owned to 25% each by the Government of Morocco, the Hassan II Fund for economic and 
social development, and the Societé d’Investissements Energétiques (SIE) (Whitley and 
Granoff 2014).  
4.1.3 OUARZAZATE  
Ouarzazate was chosen as the site for the first of the five planned solar complexes. The 
construction site is located about 10km outside the town of Ouarzazate in a sparsely populated 
area. Altogether, there will be four power plants built on an area of 3,000 hectares (KfW 
2014). The area is considered highly suitable for the erection of large scale concentrated solar 
power plants: the sunshine rate is extremely high (10 to14 hours daily all throughout the 
year), paved roads and the Mansour Eddahbi dam provide the necessary infrastructure, and 
the seismic risk of the region is low (Bahgat 2013, 31, Nfaoui and Sayigh 2013).  
Concentrated solar power (CSP) plants are highly complex and require an extended technical 
understanding. Thus, I only sketch out the two main types which are being built in Ouarzazate.  
NOOR I and II are parabolic trough power plants which, put in a nutshell, collect sunlight through 
rows of parabolic mirrors which heats a fluid that runs through pipelines connected to the mirrors. 
This in turn drives a conventional steam-turbine (KfW 2015). Noor III will be a through tower plant. 
This CSP technology bundles the sunlight in a field of thousands of mirrors which project the light 
onto a boiler on the top of a tower that again drives a conventional steam-turbine (Nur Energy [n.d.])  
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The first power plant (Noor 1) is currently being built by the Saudi company AQWA Power 
and is supposed to start operating in late 2015. Its construction is financed through public 
private partnerships (PPP) and has attracted substantial financial investments by major MDBs 
as World Bank (Clean Technology Fund), the African Development Bank, the Kreditanstalt 
für Wiederaufbau (KfW), and the European Investment Bank (CSP-World 2013). Noor II-III 
are in the pipeline with secured $2 billion of loans from the above mentioned financiers (CSP-
World 2015). AQWA Power together with its Spanish partner SENER has again won the 
international bidding process that entrusts the company with development, construction, 
operation and maintenance of the two power plants that are supposed to generate 300MW of 
Concentrated Solar Power (CSP) once they start operating in 2017 (CSP-World 2015; IFC 
2015). Together, Noor I-III will produce about 500MW. The energy will be purchased by 
MASEN and ONE through a 25 year power purchase agreement (Norton Rose Fulbright 
2010).  
 
Figure 6: Construction site of NOOR 1 in Ouarzazate. Source: http://www.evwind.es/2014/10/20/first-concentrated-solar-
power-csp-plant-in-morocco-solar-energy-project-to-open-in-2015/48190The power of the sun: CDA of the Moroccan solar 
sector  
4.2 Analysis  
Recalling my research questions, I sought to find out to what extent the texts are shaped by 
EM discourse, how they shed light on power relations, and how the issue of climate change 
gets addressed by the different actors. Searching for answers, this chapter is devoted to the 
analysis of four text documents from powerful agents within the Moroccan solar economy6: 
                                                 
6
 For full texts see appendix 2 
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The Moroccan Agency for Solar Energy (MASEN), the African Development Bank (AfDB), 
the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW), and the European Investment Bank (EIB). All four 
texts deal with the respective institution’s engagement in the solar sector. I deliberately chose 
four distinct perspectives (Europe, Africa, Morocco, and Germany) since I am interested in 
Hajer’s (1997) concept of discursive formations: although each actor has their very own 
agendas and interests which drive their engagement in the Morocco, they still come together 
striving for the same goal: the rapid expansion of solar power in the country.  
It is neither possible nor necessary for this thesis to dive into every single aspect of text 
analysis that Fairclough suggests. Therefore, I limit my analysis to those aspects that I regard 
as most relevant. I conduct the first two stages of analysis (text and discursive practice) for 
each document individually and then position them together in one common framework of 
social practice. This analytic process hopefully reveals how overlapping spheres of power 
work in the world system, and how these interplays determine the hegemony of certain 
discourses. 
I am aware that I refer to the four discourses as if they would constitute the entire discursive 
field of the Moroccan solar economy. This, of course, is not the case. However, I try to 
include a diverse range of actors. Since CDA is particularly interested in illuminating how 
power is pervasively present in language, I decided to focus on powerful actors who shape the 
discourse from inside and outside the country. The fact that their documents are the ones with 
easiest access from my position (both in terms of language and internet accessibility) speaks 
for itself.  
4.2.1 KFW  
Discursive practice  
The first document is a two-page long info sheet from the German state-owned development 
bank KfW (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau), last updated in December 2014. Germany has 
contributed €100 million to the first Noor complex, distributed between the KfW and two 
other development-oriented ministries (BMZ and BMUB). In 2013, the KfW approved a 
further €654 million loan for the second and third phase of the Ouarzazate project (Noor II 
and III). The text delivers basic project information about context, background, and purpose 
of the bank’s involvement in the Moroccan solar landscape in English.  
The text is available in both English and German on the KfW website but in none of the 
languages spoken in Morocco (Amazigh, Arabic, and French). That causes the assumption 
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that it is mainly targeted at a German, Anglophone, and well-educated international audience. 
Actually, every reader of the text needs a high level of education. This is not only apparent in 
the obvious necessity of advanced English language skills but also in the highly technical and 
economic knowledge that clearly is presupposed. If I had not studied in English and read 
dozens of articles on Morocco, CSP plants, and solar energy in general, I definitely would 
have struggled to understand the content. It is very unlikely that anyone would stumble upon 
it coincidentally since the pdf file is placed at a rather hidden spot on the KfW homepage. I 
assume that the text was written by members of the communications team of the KfW and 
then reviewed by other employees of the KfW as well as the Federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development before it got published. However, both producers and 
consumers of the text are not obvious. There is neither a reference to the authors nor does the 
reader get addressed in any way. I suggest that this highly neutral and professional style of 
writing is typical for this kind of information sheet from professional and high-ranking 
institutions. Moreover, the lack of an individual author emphasises the institutional authority.  
In terms of interdiscursivity, the text draws on four major discourses: 1) official government 
discourse, whose authority is underlined by the symbol of the German government (a bar in 
the colours of the German flag and the “Bundesadler”).  2) A techno-optimist discourse which 
entails a high degree of expertise about solar technology as well as the belief that it can help 
to mitigate climate change and push Morocco’s economic development forwards. 3) The text 
also draws on a particular environmental discourse that Dryzek conceptualises as 
administrative rationalism. I have shown earlier that this discourse that puts a large degree of 
trust and responsibility in governments, and is typical for an EM approach to addressing 
environmental problems. Finally, the text also draws on a corporate banking/finance 
discourse, interwoven with hegemonic development discourse. It is this discourse that is 
particularly promoted by multilateral development banks and typically depicts a problem or 
challenge in which one or several non-industrialised countries are involved: in this case, it is 
Morocco as a fast growing economy heavily dependent on imported fossil fuels. The 
discourse then suggests one central approach to solve it: the provision of huge financial loans 
to further stimulate economic growth (in this case the solar economy).  
Compared to my earlier introduction to EM, it becomes obvious that this particular discursive 
mix covers major parts of the EM discourse: the focus on economic growth, the importance of 
technology, and the conviction that these two aspects are not only reconcilable with 
environmental concerns but vital for addressing them. The finance and development 
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discourse, I would suggest, is an additional discursive element in order to expand and apply 
the EM discourse to non-industrialised countries and emerging economies.  
Text 
The discursive practice is clearly reflected in the actual text. It is characterised by an almost 
irritating mixture of very simple grammatical structures and at the same time a high amount of 
expertise and technical vocabulary.7 There is certainly a rather large degree of knowledge pre-
supposed. If I had not dealt extensively with the subject of CSP technique before, it would 
definitely have been problematic to understand the text that includes terms like “parabolic 
trough power plants” or “molten salt energy storage facility”. In contrast to this highly 
technical vocabulary, the description of Ouarzazate as a “well-placed tourist location” whose 
“rugged canyon and copious amounts of sunshine have served as a set for classic films such 
as Lawrence of Arabia” seems strangely out of place. It might be an attempt to establish a 
more informal relationship with the reader in order to break the otherwise distant and 
professional style.  
The text strategically constructs the bank’s role. It emphasises aspects which they consider 
positive about Morocco: the fast growing economy, the country’s role as an African pioneer 
in renewable energies, the excellent geographical and climatic conditions, as well as 
Morocco’s ambition to move beyond a fossil fuel based economy. The magnitude of the 
undertaking is highlighted (“one of the world’s largest solar power complexes”, “one of the 
world’s largest power plants”). At the same time however, it becomes clear that the 
government cannot implement its plans and projects without the help from the KfW as well as 
other international donors (“Morocco is not in the position to manage such a large-scale 
project alone.”). The text repeatedly emphasises Morocco’s dependence on fossil fuels which 
is seen to be of disadvantage for both the economy and the environment. The Moroccan 
population and their needs are not mentioned at all – it is a clear presupposition that economic 
growth will certainly result in general prosperity.  
The text refers to the Desertec idea to export solar energy from Morocco to Europe. However, 
it is presented as not having transcended the state of a “vison” for the future. The text goes on 
to state “Until now, however, some of the technical and political framework needed for this 
was not in place.” It does not become clear at this point what framework is addressed here. 
But since the previous sentence refers to Morocco’s wish to “press ahead with this vision”, 
                                                 
7
 For me as a German native speaker, this is much more visible in the German version of the text. (see also: 
section 3.3. on “limitations of the research”)  
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the reader gets the impression that the lacking technical and institutional framework was 
mainly a Moroccan failure – although in the case of Desertec that was definitely not true.  
All that contributes to a somewhat patronizing image of the KfW and other MDBs as 
benevolent donors that help the greenhorn Morocco to leave its status as an economic 
underage child and grow up to become a proper capitalist market economy.  
Climate Change  
Although the term “climate change” is not explicitly mentioned, the environmental 
friendliness of the new technology is certainly presented as an important and progressive 
feature both of the Ouarzazate complex and the emerging solar economy in general. “This 
shift to renewable energy sources will contribute to global climate protection” is probably the 
most explicitly climate-related statement, along with the fact that “600,000 ton[s] of CO2 
emissions will be saved each year [compared with conventional electricity generation]”.  
The view of the natural environment clearly reflects an ecosystem-service oriented approach. 
The desert is presented as a powerful and almost magic space, providing “inexhaustible solar 
energy”.  
4.2.2 EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK 
Discursive Practice  
The second text was published on the homepage of both EIB and European Commission 
(EC). The EC is not directly involved but has delegated its mandate to the European Union’s 
bank (EIB). The text is a press release from November 19th, 2012, titled “Major European 
support for first large solar project in North Africa”. It was published after the EIB, the 
Development Agency for France (AFD), the KfW and MASEN had a signed a deal over a 
loan package of €300 million. The text presents some basic details about the Ouarzazate 
complex and cites several members of the involved institutions who express their satisfaction 
with both the deal and the Ouarzazate power plant per se.  
However, the information is not directly communicated to a particular audience but 
intermediated by journalists of different types of media (supposedly mainly online and print). 
This has an important implication: the text will, in slightly modified versions, reach a broad 
audience, the content will be available to a large number of consumers. Due to the three 
languages in which the release is available (English, French, German), this number is further 
increased.  
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In terms of interdiscursivity, there are at least three major discourses identifiable: Most 
strongly represented is a certain polity discourse that emphasises political and economic 
cooperation as a means of strengthening international relations. The role of the EU and the 
EIB are clearly in the centre of attention here. The Moroccan Solar Plan (MSP) is not depicted 
as an autonomous undertaking but as an important part and first big step of the Mediterranean 
Solar Plan.8 The success of the Ouarzazate complex is seen as a success of the Mediterranean 
Solar Plan – not as an achievement of the Morocco government.  
The text clearly imparts an explicit EM discourse, reflected in statements like “It [the power 
plant in Ouarzazate] provides a strong and green signal for the future in terms of technology, 
economic and energy development, and job opportunities”. The emphasis on a strong political 
and regulatory framework to push the “right” form of development forward merges EM 
discourse with the international politics discourse. The third major discourse also overlaps and 
intersects with the others. It is a strong techno-optimist perspective on solar technology as a 
means to stimulate economic growth and protect the environment.  
The text contains three direct representations of other discourses. Two high-ranking members 
of European IFIs as well as a central figure of the European Commission express their 
contentment after the agreement was signed. Whereas I find it less important to find out why 
this discursive representation is placed here (since it is a typical feature of press releases) it is 
interesting to pay attention to the question of who gets actually quoted. Most important to note 
is the fact that none of the involved Moroccan actors gets a chance to speak. MASEN is 
reduced to being the “promoter” of the project, thus their role is apparently not considered as 
crucial - in contrast to the financiers who make the implementation of the project possible.  
Text 
The narrow focus on the European role within the Moroccan solar sector is strongly reflected 
in the actual text. Europe is presented as an active force, it supports, facilitates, provides, 
leads, contributes to the development of solar capacity in Morocco. Morocco itself on the 
contrary, does not get described as actively doing something (as is North Africa). This is 
reflected grammatically, since it holds almost exclusively the position of an object.  
The leading role of the EU is also supported by the repeated emphasis on Ouarzazate as a 
“milestone”, a “green signal for the future”, a “first flagship project”, as well as its status as 
                                                 
8
 The Mediterranean Solar Plan was launched in 2008 and aims at the development of 20MW RE capacity in 
European and North African countries around the Mediterranean. It involves partners from 20 countries and is 
mainly funded by the EU (PWMSP [n.d.]).  
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“the first [project] under the Moroccan solar plan”, and “one of the largest [solar complexes] 
in the world”. It becomes clear already in the headline that the Ouarzazate project would not 
be possible without the financial aid of the EU which amounts to “more than 50 per cent of 
the total cost of the project”. It fits into the picture that Ouarzazate is not praised as a 
Moroccan achievement or a result of the MSP: The two times the MSP is mentioned, it is 
directly connected to the Mediterranean Solar Plan and the EU. Except for MASEN, no 
Moroccan actor is directly mentioned: neither the government, nor the king, nor any other 
stakeholders, let alone non-governmental institutions or civil society. Except for the high 
degree of energy dependency, there is no information about energy-related developments or 
challenges in Morocco.  
Fairclough puts a great focus on features of modality to interpret a text with regards to 
certainty and authority. The EIB document is very declarative and claims a high degree of 
authority. No such words as “maybe”, “potentially”, “might” are used, neither are any 
conjunctive verb forms used. The text exclusively uses indicative verb forms even when 
talking about future prospects or the potential effects of the Ouarzazate plants on the 
Moroccan economy. The modal auxiliary “will” is used repeatedly, indicating what 
Fairclough calls “futurity plus high-affinity epistemic modality” (1993, 146).   
Climate Change  
The topic of climate change mitigation is explicitly denoted: “The project is in line with the 
objectives of European Union and the strategic objectives of the FEMIP mandate in terms of 
environmental sustainability and climate change mitigation in relation to energy demand.”  
However, the text remains unclear on how exactly the project relates to the EU and EIB 
targets, or what it is meant by the expression “in relation to energy demand”. Apparently, 
these two aspects (climate change mitigation and environmental sustainability) do not rank 
high in priorities since the quoted paragraph is located in the very end of the text. 
Nevertheless, there are a few other references to environmental issues at earlier points. For 
instance, it is indicated that the first phase of the Ouarzazate complex “will avoid the emission 
of 110,000 tonnes of carbon dioxide per year”. Moreover, the plant is praised as a 
“breakthrough of low-carbon and climate-friendly technology in Morocco”.  
It is interesting to pay attention to the way these arguments are deployed and placed in the 
text. The environmental aspect never stands for itself, but instead is always presented in 
combination with other perceived benefits. The Ouarzazate plant will substantially contribute 
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to the reduction of CO2 emissions “while developing renewable energy and energy security in 
Morocco, as well as creating jobs and promoting an integrated local solar industry.” It is not 
only a breakthrough of environmentally friendly technology but also enables Morocco to 
“reduce its dependence on energy imports”. And, as mentioned in the previous section on 
discursive practice, Ouarzazate sends out a “green signal for the future in terms of technology, 
economic and energy development, and job opportunities.” (emphasis added).  
Based on these observations it becomes obvious that climate and environmental protection are 
presented as a certain leitmotif underlying the EU’s financial commitment to the Ouarzazate 
project. However, they seem to lack intrinsic value and therefore get strategically connected 
to economic goals. In doing so, a typical EM discourse that tries to reconcile economic and 
environmental benefits is reproduced.  
4.2.3 AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK  
Discursive Practice 
This third document is an online article published about two years later (October 2014) by the 
AfDB. The bank has contributed €100 million to NOOR 1, and will also substantially co-
finance NOOR II-IV. The text is titled “AfDB is financing a real sector in Morocco: 
Ouarzazate solar power plant takes shape” and deals with the crucial role the bank plays both 
in the development of the Morocco’s solar sector and the general development of the country.  
Again there is no author mentioned which creates a notion of authority and integrity – the 
entire bank seems to back the article. It is important to note that this only works for 
institutions which possess a certain degree of authority and power. If this is not the case, the 
publication of a text without any identifiable author can easily evoke an unprofessional or 
suspicious image.  This aura of respectability and professionalism is reinforced through the 
high amount of technical terminology both in terms of solar technology and financial 
processes. It appears that it intentionally was made only accessible to a very limited number 
of people. 
In contrast to the texts of the KfW and EC, the most striking feature of this article is its 
obvious focus on African matters. Whereas the two European banks clearly attempt to tie 
Morocco closer to Europe in terms of economy and energy, the AfDB pursues a different 
strategy: the creation of an integrated Pan-African renewable energy network. This African 
development discourse puts a special focus on energy as the main issue for achieving 
inclusive and green growth – the two main objectives of the AfDB. It is linked to a particular 
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neoliberal development discourse typical for MDBs. This discourse promotes huge financial 
loans as the basis for development, economic growth, and consequently as an alleviation of 
poverty and inequality. It is framed by the AfDB’s green and inclusive growth strategy that is 
present throughout the text. Similarly to the EC, the bank praises its own role in Morocco’s 
solar sector and constructs Ouarzazate project as part of their enormous development strategy 
for the country.  
Text 
The caption titled “AfDB is financing a real sector in Morocco: Ouarzazate solar power plant 
takes shape” reveals the central propositions of the text. The primary position of the bank’s 
name indicates who the main protagonist of the article is: the African Development Bank 
itself. The formulation conveys the impression that the AfDB finances not only the 
Ouarzazate power plant but the entire Moroccan solar sector.  
Accordingly, most other distinctive linguistic features of the text are directly related to this 
particular (self-)construction of the AfDB. As outlined in the previous section, the bank sees 
its role not only as a financier of certain projects but as an agent of growth and development. 
This is explicitly addressed in statements like “The Bank plays a very prominent role in 
advancing Morocco’s development agenda” or “The Bank will continue to engage in charting 
the way forward in Morocco” (note the capital B). Its authority is further emphasised by the 
usage of highly technical jargon. Expressions like real sector, public-private partnership, 
beneficiaries, or concessional loan (to name just a few) make the text only accessible for 
reader with a certain degree of knowledge in banking and finance. Moreover, the text 
repeatedly refers to employees of the bank as “experts” and “specialists”.  
Throughout the text, the bank refers to itself 16 times (four times as AfDB, three times as 
African Development Bank, and nine times as “the Bank”). In the majority of cases, it holds 
the clausal position of the subject which further emphasises their powerful agency. The word 
“Morocco” appears six times throughout the text but only in one instance is it presented as an 
acting entity. But even in this case, the country does not act independently but is merely 
“achieving these goals [extension of infrastructure and access to energy] as outlined by the 
African Development Bank” (emphasis added). Although King Mohammed V and MASEN 
are mentioned, the development of the solar sector seems completely unpolitical. The entire 
administrative and institutional adjustments the government has undertaken (as described in 
section 4.2.) are disregarded.  
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The text strategically constructs a certain image of energy in the African context. Growth of 
the (renewable) energy sector is the essential condition for economic growth which in turn is 
used almost as a synonym for “development". To underline this point, Aly Abou-Sabaa, a 
high-ranking member of the bank is quoted as saying: “Energy is vital to efficiently drive 
African economies. […] Businesses and industries permanently need power to run smoothly. 
And any African nation to grow to maturity and become a force to reckon with in upcoming 
years should develop it.” This latter statement contains a metaphor that mirrors the bank’s 
growth paradigm. It equates “grow to maturity” with economic development, implying that 
most African countries have so far failed to do so. Only if a country grows mature, i.e. 
develops economically it can “become a force to reckon with” – a clear instance of capitalist 
ideology.  However, there is a clear lack of context. Questions like: why does Africa lack 
growth and access to electricity? What is the situation in Morocco like in terms of political, 
economic, social, geographical, and energy-related conditions and developments? Also, the 
bank deliberately excludes the other MDB’s who have contributed largely to the 
implementation of NOOR 1.  
Another issue that is left out is climate change. The only instance where there is a faint hint at 
environmental issues of any sort is the one time when the word “green” appears in the text, 
referring to the AfDB’s strategy of green and inclusive growth. Otherwise, the topic is 
completely absent.  
4.2.4 MASEN 
Discursive Practice  
The 6-pages long document is available at the MASEN homepage under the section 
“communiqués de presse”. It does not have a title but is listed as “Signature de deux 
conventions à Ouarzazate le 26 octobre 2010”. It gives an overview of the Moroccan 
renewable energy sector in general, and then goes on to present more details on the solar 
sector, the mission and objectives of MASEN, and the Ouarzazate power plant. The text is 
written in French and published as a visually appealing pdf document, thus it seems to be 
some kind of general information document rather than a press release. It is difficult to draw 
conclusions about text production, distribution, and consumption since the MASEN 
homepage is not particularly well organised. Some parts are made available in English, some 
only in French or Arabic, there are many broken links and in general only basic information 
and very few documents provided. Thus, I will limit my analysis to some observations and 
focus more on the actual text.  
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The document is only accessible for French speakers. Thus, it has not only a more limited but 
also a different target group of potential consumers than the other texts I have analysed. In 
Morocco, French is mainly spoken by the well-educated and embedded in a complex web of 
post-colonial structures and norms (cf. van den Hout 2013). During our research, I noticed 
that our translator Fatima oftentimes introduced herself, the team, and our research in French 
and then switched to Arabic. When she talked about academic or official matters during the 
conversation though, she would switch back to French. Consequently, I believe that 
publishing a text in only French has particular implications in Morocco. However, since I am 
not very familiar with the cultural context, I leave it at this observation.  
In terms of interdiscursivity, I have identified three distinct main discourses: 1) a techno-
optimist development discourse, 2) an environmental discourse, and 3) a discourse that I call 
the “MASEN-discourse”. The techno-optimist development discourse presents renewable 
energies and solar energy in particular as a unique option to stimulate economic development 
in the country, meet the rising energy demands, and reduce dependency from fossil fuel 
imports. The environmental discourse emphasises the potential of the transformation of the 
energy sector to help protect the environment, reduce CO2 emissions, and mitigate climate 
change. And then there is the MASEN discourse, which frames the institution as being so 
crucial for the development of the country’s solar economy that it almost seems to equate the 
two. It is a very strong institutional discourse that promotes MASEN as the main body 
responsible for governing the development of solar power in Morocco and implementing the 
Moroccan Solar Plan. MASEN’s legitimacy is supported by a quote from the King (p. 2), the 
highest authority of the country.  
Again, this pattern of interdiscursivity indicates that the text entails a clear EM discourse. It 
presents solar technology as an opportunity for environmentally friendly economic growth, 
implemented within a strong institutional setting that creates the necessary framework 
conditions. Since this institutional setting is more or less directly connected to the king, it 
claims an extremely high degree of authority.  
Text 
The document is the first out of the four texts that has been published so it is very likely that 
the donors have read it before the decisions about their financial support were made. Instead 
of highlighting the need for cooperation, there is a general overtone of competitiveness: The 
country aims not only at drawing level with the international standards of the solar energy 
sector (p.4) but at taking on a pioneer role in the field (p.2 and 4). There is the explicit goal to 
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be the first African country to develop large-scale solar projects (p.2). The substantial amount 
of total costs for the implementation of the solar plan is mentioned (9 billion dollar, p.2) but 
whereas the MDB’s are very explicit about their crucial role as financiers, the MASEN 
document remains silent on the sources of funding.  
The text strategically constructs an integrating notion of Moroccan identity. Instead of naming 
particular actors, “Morocco” is oftentimes used as the acting subject of the clause. To give an 
example: “Le Maroc a défini une nouvelle stratégie énergétique” (p.1) raises the question 
Who is ‘le Maroc’? Looking at the distribution of political power in the country raises the 
suspicion that the answer is: Sa Majesté le Roi Mohamed VI himself. Expressions like “notre 
grand projet” (“our great project”) indicate a dominant top-down “L’état c’est moi” strategy. 
The king deploys this kind of integrating rhetoric in his speech that is quoted in the text, 
substituting “the government and I” with the personal plural pronoun “Nous”. In the end, 
these formulations serve the same purpose: the creation of a homogenised Moroccan “We” 
blurs the lines between the categories that determine social status (like ethnicity, class, 
gender) and obscures unequal power relations as well as exclusion and oppression of social 
groups.  
The text deploys further strategies of transitivity: it uses passive verb forms like “MASEN is 
considered as a key actor” (p.4, my translation) or “Based on the Moroccan law 57-09, the 
implementation of the solar plan has been entrusted to MASEN” (p.3, my translation). 
Information about the agent gets omitted but it is quite clear that it refers to some high-
ranking institutional power like the government or the king. Obviously, it would not make any 
sense to explicitly name these since it was them who established MASEN.  
In terms of vocabulary, the institution’s agency as well as the active progress in implementing 
the solar plan get highlighted by the repeated use of the terms “mise en place”, “mise en 
oeuvre”, and “mise en service” (they can be translated as implement, realise, or put into 
action). Taken together, these terms appear 12 times throughout the text. Generally they 
invoke a notion of activity, presence, and responsibility – a self-image that MASEN certainly 
attempts to convey to the public.  
Even more overwording occurs related to the term “développement". It is used in manifold 
combinations in 17 instances of the text. To name just a few: “développement économique et 
social” (p.1), “Développement des ressources énergétiques nationales” (p.1), “développement 
de l’expertise” (p.3), “développement de l’intégration industrielle” (p.4). The extreme 
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emphasis on this word hints at an ideological struggle hidden behind it (cf. Todolí 2006, 12). 
Interpreted from a critical point of view, it might be an attempt to justify the fact that a small 
corrupt elite governs Morocco and hugely profits from the country’s industrialization whereas 
poverty and inequality remain pervasive issues (Black 2010, Williams 2014). Framing the 
MSP as a development strategy may be seen as an attempt to disprove or veil this. This of 
course is an overtly critical view. Looking at it from a more moderate angle, the emphasis on 
development can be interpreted as the attempt to establish a certain discourse of the solar 
energy sector as being beneficial for the entire Moroccan society. Moreover, this kind of 
development rhetoric serves well to attract international donors with an explicit development 
mandate – a mission that obviously worked out well, considering the large financial support 
that the MSP has attracted.  
Climate Change 
Issues of climate change and environmental sustainability are addressed several times 
throughout the text. They are listed among the main reasons for the expansion of the solar 
sector. Large scale energy supply from renewable sources is promoted due to its ability to 
protect the environment and offer a substitution to fossil fuels (p.1 and 2). Solar energy is said 
to combat global warming by reducing CO2 emissions by 3.5 million tons per year (p.2).  
The text names another crucial goal of the country’s new energy strategy: rationalizing 
consumption (p.1). However, this does by no means imply an actual decline of energy 
consumption but an optimization of energy production and an energy sector that is better 
integrated into the national and international energy market (p.1).  
Noticeably, environment-related aspects only get mentioned on the first two pages where an 
overview of the energy strategy and the solar plan is presented. Over the next four pages 
where MASEN’s mandate and strategy are introduced more detailed, this argumentation does 
not reappear.  
4.3 Social Practice: A common framework  
The previous section aimed at developing an in-depth understanding of the four texts in 
question. Each text was briefly introduced and then analysed for the conditions of its 
production and consumption, interdiscursivity, and linguistic features. The analysis revealed 
that the texts showed both significant similarities and important differences.  
This section will expand on my findings. In a last step, I want to analyse the broader social 
practice as outlined in Fairclough’s three-dimensional approach. As laid out in section 3.2.1., 
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the analysis of the social practice dimension serves as an explanation for the findings of the 
previously studied discursive practice by embedding them into a broader social context. For 
that purpose, I will study the order of discourse (the entirety of discourses present in a social 
field or an institution which in my case is the Moroccan solar economy) and draw conclusions 
from this.  
Figure 8 visualizes the different discourses that the documents I have analysed draw on. The 
figure shows that two of these discourses hold a very prominent position which is due to the 
central role they play in the texts. I will go into details about them in the next three sections, 
followed by some thoughts on the importance of looking at the discursive differences to an 
equal extent. The chapter will conclude with reflections on the role of climate change.  
 
 
Figure 7: The order of discourse of Morocco's solar sector, source: author 
 
4.3.1 ECOLOGICAL MODERNISATION  
I suggest that the majority of discourses that I have identified can be brought together under 
the meta-discourse of EM. I will briefly go over them in order to justify this proposition. This 
also helps to recall the concepts introduced in chapter 2.  
The techno-optimist discourse is clearly visible in each text. Technology (and solar 
technology in particular) is believed to contribute to the solution of various challenges: energy 
dependence, lack of economic growth, unemployment, climate change, political and 
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economic isolation, and underdevelopment. The green growth discourse is special for the 
African Development Bank. In my understanding, it is very similar to EM discourse but, as 
the name indicates, with a stronger focus on the aspect of growth. The bank describes it as a 
path  
(…) that is not only rapid but which also leads to equality of treatment and opportunity, deep reductions 
in poverty and large increases in jobs. Green growth ensures that inclusive growth is sustainable, by 
managing responsibly the assets on which it is based, spurring job creation, innovation and 
development, and providing efficiency and welfare gains. (African Development Bank 2014, 3) 
Except for labelling it “green” and “sustainable”, it remains unclear how the concept takes 
environmental issues into account. This may explain why the text remains silent on any 
climate related matters. For this reason, I locate it next to a discourse I call environmental 
opportunism (based on Klein’s term crisis opportunism). This discourse addresses various 
environmental problems like climate change or CO2 emissions. However, every 
environmental argument is always backed up by another socio-economic benefit of solar 
energy. Environmental concerns are almost presented as (business) opportunities which 
evokes unpleasant associations with the World Bank’s crisis opportunism strategy, or the 
Ecomodernist Manifesto’s proclamation of a “great Anthropocene”. Finally, an institutional 
discourse that holds a dominant position in the MASEN text emphasises the institution’s 
central role in the administration, coordination, and implementation of the restructuring 
process of the energy sector. However, the role of any governmental body is a markedly 
lacking in the other texts. The banks seem to entrust their money and the market to kick off 
the economic development in Morocco.  
EM as sociological thought originally was developed in Western Europe, notably Germany, 
the Netherlands, and the UK (Mol and Sonnenfeld 2000). It was addressed at the 
improvement of the environmental performance in industrialised states (Sonnenfeld 2000, 1). 
It was not before the mid-1990s that the focus was broadened and started to include non-
European and non-OECD countries (Mol and Sonnenfeld 2000). The previously highlighted 
need for a strong nation-state has changed – nowadays, one of the major roles of governments 
is the stimulation of “lead markets for environmental innovations” (Jänicke and Jacobs 2006, 
31). Although specific EM theory is mainly drawn on in Western Europe, the term is 
increasingly used to refer to a very broad discourse that positively acknowledges the fusion of 
economic and ecological concerns, and believes in mechanisms of the market, regulated by 
state policies. What it lacks, however, is a component that extends it to non-European and 
non-industrialised (or less-industrialised) contexts. I suggest that this is the reason why a 
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second discourse holds a very central position in the discourse around Morocco’s solar 
economy.  
4.3.2 THE HEGEMONIC DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSE 
One discourse that I have not considered before is present throughout all four texts: I called it 
the hegemonic development discourse (HD discourse). The HD discourse reproduces one 
specific development paradigm: development through growth. It is the leitmotif of the MDB 
agendas and promoted by the UN.9 In order to understand its predominant position, we need 
to take a brief excursion into the history of the World Bank as well as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF).  
Both World Bank and IMF were established after World War II as parts of the Bretton Woods 
system. Their mission was to prevent the sort of economic collapse that had paved the way for 
the rise of the Third Reich (Klein 2007, 162). Whereas in the early stages, Keynes himself 
praised the institutions as effective control mechanisms for the markets (ibid.), their role 
changed with the “neoliberal counterrevolution” of the 1980s and 1990s that “swept away 
both Keynesianism and the dream of a new world order” (Hornborg 2001, 26). Leading 
positions in both World Bank and IMF were increasingly filled by alumni of the Chicago 
School whose most prominent personality was Milton Friedman himself. By the end of the 
1980s, the agendas of the two institutions were more or less congruent with neoliberal market 
economics, advocating privatization, deregulation, and large cuts of government spending 
(Klein 2007, 163; 2014, 19). They engaged increasingly in what Klein calls crisis 
opportunism: developing countries that desperately turned to them for help had to implement 
so-called structural adjustment programs in order to receive loans and grants, so that more and 
more countries were forced onto the path of neoliberalism. It was almost impossible to turn 
their offer down: “When privatization and free-trade policies are packaged together with a 
financial bailout, countries have little choice but to accept the whole package” (2007, 164).  
Morocco was one of the countries facing a debt crisis in the early 1980s. As a response, the 
government started pushing economic development forwards with the help of the World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Paris Club of creditors (Edo 2002, 
224). Through the imposed structural adjustment programs, King Mohamed VI and his 
                                                 
9
 Out of seven strategies that were formulated as a financial agenda for reaching the millennium goals in 2002, 
six were exclusively aimed at financial and economic strategies, retrieved May 18, 2015, from: 
https://www.bmz.de/en/what_we_do/principles/german-contribution-to-international-development-policy-
goals/index.html 
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government directed the country onto a neoliberal path of economic modernisation. Various 
programs of structural reforms aim at stimulating economic growth, diversify the economy, 
increase competitiveness, and creating jobs. Market reforms and deregulation are the main 
tools to achieve this. The country is part of more than 50 neoliberal trade agreements (AMDI, 
[n.d.]). For international business, Morocco is an attractive new market with favourable 
conditions like political stability and ongoing extensive infrastructure programs (Auswärtiges 
Amt 2014, Hamour 1998, 138). Henry Azzam, Deutsche Bank's chief executive officer for 
MENA calls Casablanca “the business centre of the Mahgreb” (Copetas 2007).  
Most of the mentioned programs and structural reforms are continuously supported by MDBs 
through technical and analytical consulting and significant financial aid. Still, Morocco’s 
foreign debt has been growing and it is the IMF who obligates the government to take 
measures to cut down the national deficit (Thakore 2014). Nowadays, the World Bank and the 
IMF acknowledge the urgency to combat climate change: “If we do not confront climate 
change, we will not end poverty” (World Bank 2015b). HD discourse now embraces global 
environmental concerns and the MDBs as its most powerful advocate grand their support to 
climate-friendly projects. This means that Morocco finds itself in the grip of powerful IFIs 
which is held up by the enormous amounts of foreign loans that the solar economy is 
attracting. The government has adopted the HD discourse which is clearly displayed in the 
texts. The same goes for the other actors: every text reproduces an almost identical notion of 
the growth-equals-development ideology.  
4.3.3 A PERFECT MATCH: EM AND THE HEGEMONIC DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSE  
The previous two sections have shown that the four analysed texts are infused by two meta-
discourses: a hegemonic development discourse and an ecological modernisation discourse. 
The two discourses overlap in large parts so that the boundaries between them are oftentimes 
blurred. This proves not only their close relatedness but also demonstrates the complex, 
flexible, and contingent nature of discourses. Although both EM and the HD discourse have 
their own distinct academic as well as spatio-temporal background, both discourses are 
largely influenced by the general neoliberal shift of the 1980s that was significantly pushed 
through by the Bretton Woods institutions. At the same time, they are also shaped by the 
global environmental concerns that came up at around the same time. Both promote the same 
eco-modern paradigm: economic growth and environmental degradation do not have to go 
hand in hand. However, I indicated earlier in this section that EM discourse lacks the 
development component that is needed to extend it to non-industrialised contexts. This gap is 
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filled by the hegemonic development discourse. This insight is presented through my analysis 
that exposed a pattern of interdiscursivity which weaved together different discourses to one 
common story-line. The story-line equates the development of the solar sector with the 
development of the entire country and thus connects technology and economic growth to 
development, human well-being, and environmental protection.  
The wide-ranging acknowledgement of this equation is not surprising. Considering that both 
EM and HD discourse are very potent discourses for themselves, they are even more powerful 
when brought together. Due to the predominant ideological position of the HD discourse, it is 
a common-sense assumption that it is true. MDBs are widely accepted as sources of 
knowledge and expertise, therefore, the majority of people does not question their claims. 
Moreover, the large ideological intersections of EM and HD discourse further facilitate a 
successful alliance.  
4.3.4 DISCURSIVE STRUGGLES  
However, these considerations should not neglect the fact that each actor has individual 
reasons for their engagement in the solar sector. Section 2.5. introduced Hajer’s concept of 
discursive formations which describes the alliance of several actors with (potentially) 
diverging interests. These actors form a discursive coalition in order to pursue a common 
political project. To this end, they need a credible story-line that justifies both their respective 
engagement and the common goal. 
I suggest that this is exactly what we see in the four texts: the common political project is the 
rapid expansion of the Moroccan solar sector. The actors are united by the believe that a 
strong domestic solar economy will result in overall development of the country, which forms 
their common story-line. Nonetheless, each of the actors pursues their own agenda. This 
agenda is partly revealed by the use of particular discourses that do not belong to the meta-
discourses of development and EM as developed earlier in this section. For instance, the 
AfDB intensively deploys an integrated African development discourse which is completely 
neglected by the others. Their interest in a strong Moroccan solar economy is its importance 
for an integrated pan-African energy network which in turn is crucial for economic growth 
and international competitiveness of the continent as a whole. In contrast, the EC’s attempt to 
establish a Mediterranean energy union obviously aims at tying Morocco (plus the entire 
MENA region) to the European continent. Thus, the text in question strongly draws on a 
discourse of political cooperation and integration with focus on the EU, constructing the 
Moroccan solar sector as an integral part of the Mediterranean Solar Plan. Any Moroccan 
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agency is completely neglected. This is an extreme contrast to MASEN’s perspective:  The 
institution underlines the country’s competitive relationship to other states and highlights its 
ambition to establish a position as solar pioneers both in Africa and internationally. The 
construction of a common Moroccan identity obfuscates power relations within the country 
and indicates powerful group interests on the highest political level. The KfW document 
provided the least hints about a particular agenda of the bank or the German government. The 
one thing standing out is the reference to potential energy exports from Morocco to Europe in 
the future. This may not come as a surprise, considering the broad political support for the 
DESERTEC concept in Germany. Also, Germany ought to have specific economic interests 
in the Moroccan CSP projects – during our field visit to Ouarzazate we learnt that the 
majority of the mirror technology is imported from Germany.  
Due to a strong common story-line, these discursive differences amongst the different actors 
have not proved obstructive to the development of the solar sector so far. However, this does 
not mean that there is no potential for conflict. Taking a look behind the scenes of the joint 
reproduction of discourses unveils that there are many conflicting interests at stake. 
Morocco’s emerging solar economy appears to be an arena for hegemonic struggles, hidden 
behind a façade of common interests and goals. In my view, Hajer’s concept lacks this long-
term perspective since it does not address any potential struggles.   
4.3.5 SO WHAT ABOUT CLIMATE CHANGE?  
This thesis was inspired by my own astonishment given the fact that none of the main 
stakeholders we interviewed in Morocco addressed climate change in detail. There was a lot 
of very general talking about the need to push renewable energy forwards in order to 
contribute to climate protection. But none of the interviewees seemed motivated by a genuine 
concern about environmental issues. This impression was supported by the four texts I 
analysed. 
Within the discourses, the issue of climate change is addressed rather isolated. Rothe (2014) 
notes in his analysis of the Desertec discourse that “climate change is taken out of its socio-
economic context […] and presented discursively as an external threat to humanity” (15). 
Although the texts I analysed are not that drastic, it is certainly right that climate change is 
constructed as something external to society, rather than being a product of it. The only 
culprit who gets mentioned is the combustion of fossil fuels, though this process is presented 
completely detached from capitalist production and consumption processes. The MASEN 
document contains the most explicit references to climate change. With this strategy they 
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follow the rules of the game: in order to successfully request loans from MDBs, it is necessary 
to tick the sustainability box. Overall, the texts remain very unclear about the exact way in 
which the solar economy contributes to climate protection. 
EM admits that there can be conflicts between economy and environment which is how its 
own importance as a bridge between the two realms is justified. Problems like air pollution or 
sewage problems are time and space contingent, cause and consequence are easily identifiable 
due to their local dimension. Even the more global issue of the depleting ozone layer could be 
successfully addressed by a mixture of policies and green innovation. Climate change, on the 
contrary, plays in a different league. Thus I would argue that EM is potentially capable of 
solving problems on a small scale but that it is simply not designed for dealing with the 
universal challenge of climate protection.  
However, due to its hegemonic status, there is no real need for the texts to justify the claim 
that economic growth and environmental degradation can be decoupled. It is simply a 
common-sense assumption which the majority of people do not question. In CDA terms, this 
is called “presupposition” and can be used to draw conclusions about the ideological position 
of the author and text (Todolí 2006, 14). The texts I have analysed present it as a given that 
the expansion of renewable energy capacity will help to mitigate climate change. In some 
cases, the fact is added that this is achieved through the reduction of CO2 emissions. Apart 
from that, there is no further explanation on how exactly Morocco’s solar economy and 
renewable technology generally are connected to climate change.  
Ignoring this gap proves beneficial for all of the actors. EM is rooted in a capitalist paradigm 
that sees economic growth as an inevitable necessity. But the successful combat of climate 
change requires a shift of this very foundation that our entire society is built upon. If they 
delved deeper into climate issues, the stakeholders would, for instance, be forced to justify 
why the Moroccan government builds coal power plants and solar power plants at the same 
time, and why they nonetheless present the country’s energy sector as progressive and 
sustainable. However, due to the scientific consensus about human-caused climate change, it 
is more or less obligatory for political and economic decision-makers to at least mention the 
topic. Isolating climate change from society is therefore a necessary discursive tactic to bind 
the unlikely alliance between different actors, banks, politicians and corporations and 
ultimately between economy and sustainability. Simultaneously, this means that casting light 
on this dark side of the sun also has the potential to reveal the inherent conflicts and 
contradictions, unveiling the destructive forces of ecological modernisation.  
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5 Conclusion 
The point of departure for this thesis was the question why none of the stakeholders of 
Morocco’s solar economy mentioned climate change as a major motivation for their 
involvement. In order to search for answers, I decided to look at text material in which 
different actors justified their engagement. My over-arching research question was: What are 
the motivations driving the massive and rapid expansion of the Moroccan solar economy?  
Furthermore, I developed three guiding questions for the analysis. These questions aimed at 
studying the presence of ecological modernisation discourse in the texts, the strategic 
construction and framing of climate change, and the power struggles and unequal power 
relations underlying the discourses. Through the application of Fairclough’s three-
dimensional discourse analysis method to four different texts I found out that EM plays a lead 
role in the solar economy discourse. However, it is complemented by the hegemonic 
development discourse promoted mostly by multilateral development banks. This discourse 
adds a development component to EM which traditionally applies to an EU context. Concerns 
about climate change do certainly not belong to the main drivers for the expansion of the solar 
sector. I have argued that none of the powerful actors of the Moroccan solar economy has a 
serious interest in climate change mitigation. Rather, it turns out as advantageous to neglect 
the issue because it would raise serious questions about purpose and goal of the respective 
actor’s engagement. Moreover, EM is theoretically not equipped to address complex and 
global issues like climate change due to its focus on national and regional environmental 
matters. The texts in question presuppose a correlation between increasing capacity of 
renewable energy and successful climate protection. Due to EM’s status as a predominant 
ideology (consolidated by the adoption of the hegemonic development discourse), there is no 
need to further explain this. It is simply accepted as “common-sense” knowledge.  Although 
the stakeholders of the solar economy come together in a discursive formation based on eco-
modernist ideas, there are different interests at play. The analysis revealed that each of them 
pursues an individual mission which may sooner or later lead to a conflict of economic and 
political interests. Some of these missions are more compatible than others so it is hard to 
predict at what point the alliance might fall apart.  
I believe that the case of Morocco’s solar sector illustrates central issues of renewable 
energies today. They are equally promoted by governments, corporations, environmentalists 
as the solution to mitigate climate change. Mostly however, this solution is framed by 
ecological modernisation thought that sees economic growth as a necessity for human well-
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being. Thus, the problem-solving approach focuses on technical solutions rather than 
addressing underlying structures of power, inequality, and injustice. As the rising level of 
CO2 concentration in the atmosphere shows, past and present attempts to fight climate change 
were not successful. As long as renewable energies are simply incorporated into the current 
system, they will only reproduce and maintain unequal power relations instead of providing a 
way to mitigate climate change and facilitate social change.  
Morocco’s solar economy has a large potential for future research. It would be a very 
interesting expansion of this thesis to conduct a detailed study of how the solar economy 
perpetuates unequal power relations within the country. This could be further continued by 
investigating the potential of small-scale approaches to shift these power relations and thus 
lead to empowerment and democratisation. Surely the case opens up numerous opportunities 
to politicise climate change and thus to fight the roots of the crisis instead of merely trying to 
mitigate its consequences.  
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2. Material for CDA  
2.1. KfW: Project information Ouarzazate  
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2.2. AfDB is financing a real sector in Morocco: Ouarzazate solar power plant takes shape  
With a team of African Development Bank experts, at the margin of the various Bank events 
in Morocco, the Vice-President in charge of Governance, Agriculture and Human 
Development, Aly Abou-Sabaa, on Thursday, October 16, 2014 visited a Bank cherished 
solar power plant project (NOORo1) in Ouarzazate, which energy specialists are calling “the 
world’s largest using concentrated solar power technology.”  
The Vice-President, accompanied by the Bank’s Resident Representative in Morocco, Yacine 
Fal, the project task manager, Adama Moussa, and a Bank Communication expert, held a 
technical meeting with the project implementing unit, the Morocco Agency for Solar Energy 
(MASEN). NOORo1 consists of the construction of the one thermo solar plan with a gross 
capacity of 160 megawatts, using solar energy collected in a field of mirrors (parabolic 
collectors) as the primary energy source. It is the first phase of the 500 MW Ouarzazate solar 
complex project, which is being built on an area of 3,000 hectares.  
NOORo1 is structured on approximately 700 hectares, as a public-private partnership (PPP) 
and includes a system of thermal energy storage using molten salts, which allows the power 
generation even when there is no solar radiation, to effectively function at full capacity for 
three hours.  
In engaging in this project, the Bank Group has contributed in providing an appropriate and 
long-term response to factors that undermine inclusive growth in the continent: lack of 
infrastructure and limited access to energy. With the effective implementation of the 
Ouarzazate solar plan, Morocco will be on track to achieving these goals as outlined by the 
African Development Bank.  
“Energy is vital to efficiently drive African economies and its impact is recognized. This plant 
is an important step in Morocco’s green and inclusive growth strategy, and should be 
replicated all over the continent," Abou-Sabaa said, adding: “Businesses and industries 
permanently need power to run smoothly. And any African nation to grow to maturity and 
become a force to reckon with in upcoming years should develop it.”  
Moussa also affirmed that “this huge solar project will positively impact beneficiaries in the 
project zone, as well as the entire country, in terms of productivity for SMEs and SMIs [small 
and medium industries], and job opportunities for the youth. It will help diversify the 
Kingdom’s energy production sources a well.” During the visit, the Bank team noticed the 
presence of more than 1,700 workers actively performing on the project site, of which 90% 
are Moroccans. More than 30% of all the workers are natives of Ouarzazate region.  
The project is structured as a public-private partnership (PPP) between MASEN and a 
consortium led by the Saudi International Company for Water and Power (ACWA Power).  
It is the third of its kind that the AfDB is financing in the country’s renewable energy sector 
after the Ain Beni Mathar Solar Power Plant and the Integrated Wind, Water and Rural 
Electrification Project.  
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The official launch of the first phase of the Ouarzazate solar power plant took place on May 
10, 2013 in the Moroccan rural municipality of Ghessate (Ouarzazate Province), was attended 
by King Mohammed VI and representatives of the Moroccan Agency for Solar Energy 
(MASEN) and the African Development Bank (AfDB) Group.  
The AfDB has financed the first phase of the works, with EUR 100 million, from its own 
resources, in addition to a concessional loan of USD 100 million granted through the Clean 
Technology Fund (CTF).  
The Bank plays a very prominent role in advancing Morocco’s development agenda, with a 
cumulative commitment in the country’s energy sector is estimated at EUR 1.35 billion (15 
billion dirhams) out of a total commitment of EUR 10 billion to all economic sectors.  
The opening of the Bank’s office in the country (MAFO) in 2006 reinforces the institution’s 
presence on the ground, and strategically positions it to step up its policy dialogue, technical 
assistance and capacity-building operations in the country. “The Bank will continue to engage 
in charting the way forward in Morocco,” Yacine Fal said.  
 
2.3. First solar project in North Africa receives strong European support of €345m*, 
representing more than 50 per cent of the total cost of the project (EIB)  
A financial commitment of €300m was signed today in Marrakech by the European 
Investment Bank (EIB), the Development Agency for France (AFD), KfW Entwicklungsbank 
(KfW) and MASEN, promoter of the Ouarzazate solar complex in Morocco. This loan 
package was facilitated by a €30m grant contribution from the European Union in December 
2011. 
This European financing is supporting the first phase of the Ouarzazate solar complex, which 
involves the construction of a parabolic-trough concentrated solar power (CSP) plant with a 
gross installed capacity of between 125 and 160 MW and a minimum energy storage capacity 
of 3 hours. The project will be the first under the Moroccan Solar Plan and the largest project 
so far under the Mediterranean Solar Plan, whose aim is to deploy 20 GW of additional 
renewable energy capacity by 2020.  
The Ouarzazate solar complex aims to reach a potential capacity of 500 MW, which is 
equivalent to powering a city of 250,000 inhabitants. Once fully developed, this solar 
complex will be one of the largest in the world. In its first phase alone, it will avoid the 
emission of 110,000 tonnes of carbon dioxide per year while developing renewable energy 
and energy security in Morocco, as well as creating jobs and promoting an integrated local 
solar industry. 
EIB Vice-President Philippe de Fontaine Vive commented: “As the lead European 
financial institution on this project, the EIB is proud to contribute both its financing and its 
technical expertise acquired across Europe for all sources of renewable energy. The first 
phase of Ouarzazate is a milestone for the success of the Mediterranean Solar Plan in the 
region. It provides a strong and green signal for the future in terms of technology, economic 
and energy development, and job opportunities.” 
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The Ambassador Head of the EU Delegation to Morocco Eneko Landaburu said: "The EU 
and Morocco share similar opportunities and constraints when it comes to energy, which 
makes it important to support the progressive integration of our respective energy markets, as 
well as the joint development of renewable energy. Today, through the grant provided by its 
Neighbourhood Investment Facility and the loan provided by the European Investment Bank, 
the European Union is strongly supporting the first flagship project under the Moroccan 
Solar Plan." 
"The implementation of this power plant will enable the breakthrough of low-carbon and 
climate-friendly technology in Morocco. At the same time, the country can reduce its 
dependence on energy imports. With this power plant we are coming a big step closer to 
realising the ambitious energy plan of supplying many of the Northern African countries with 
renewable energies," said Dr Norbert Kloppenburg, Member of the Executive Board of KfW. 
The project is in line with the objectives of European Union and the strategic objectives of the 
FEMIP mandate in terms of environmental sustainability and climate change mitigation in 
relation to energy demand. 
The first phase of the Ouarzazate solar complex will be operational in 2015. 
*European support: 
• EIB: €100m of a total of €300m (EIB Board approval on 13 December 2011) 
• EU: €30m (grant) 
• AFD: €100m 
• KfW/Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ): €100m 
• KfW Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU): 
€15m 
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2.4. Masen (Les énergies renouvables, un secteur d’avnenir) 
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